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Executive Summary 
 
The economic purpose of an Overseas Investment Act should be to enable foreign investment 
that has a positive (or at least non-negative) impact on a country‘s economic performance, 
and to prevent investments which will likely have detrimental net effects. An examination of 
both the content and application of the New Zealand Overseas Investment Act 2005 finds that 
it is not well-aligned with this purpose.  
  
The Act‘s stated purpose is ―to acknowledge that it is a privilege for overseas persons to own 
or control sensitive New Zealand assets‖. Consequently, the Act focuses principally upon 
identifying those New Zealand assets qualifying as ―sensitive‖, defining who qualifies as a 
―privileged‖ overseas investor, and the specific terms of transactions under which ownership 
and control of sensitive assets transfer to overseas persons.  
 
In determining what constitutes a ―sensitive‖ asset, the Act makes a largely arbitrary 
distinction based on the nature of any land involved in the transaction (either the sale of the 
land itself, or the sale of shares in a business with an interest – such as leasehold – in land 
deemed ―sensitive‖). The definition of ―sensitive land‖ encompasses a very large proportion 
of New Zealand‘s territory, including farm land, any land subject to conservation or heritage 
orders, non-urban land in excess of 5 hectares, land in excess of 0.2 hectares adjoining the 
foreshore or land in excess of 0.4 hectares adjoining a lake, reserve, heritage or conservation 
land or adjoining land subject to conservation or heritage orders. 
 
Where no land deemed sensitive is involved in proposed acquisitions by overseas persons of 
significant business assets, a test requiring only minimal screening of the investor‘s character 
is applied. Consequently, foreign investment in significant New Zealand businesses with no 
sensitive land holdings, that could have a detrimental effect upon the New Zealand economy, 
can proceed without any check being undertaken of likely economic consequences. 
Conversely where sensitive land is involved – even if it is peripheral to the transaction and its 
use is unlikely to change as a result of the change in ownership – then the Act requires the 
transaction can proceed only if there are strictly positive benefits (or in many instances, a 
higher standard of ―substantial and identifiable‖ positive benefits) to New Zealand. While the 
required process for the assessment of benefits might appear similar to a standard cost-benefit 
analysis, the Act excludes some relevant costs and benefits, and permits arbitrary weighting 
by the decision makers of the costs and benefits actually considered. 
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An examination of published decisions under the Act shows that in practice, the determination 
of benefits to the New Zealand economy excludes consideration of substantive private gains 
accruing to New Zealand vendors as a consequence of the transaction proceeding. 
Consequently, potentially beneficial transactions can be refused, with attendant negative flow-
through consequences: disincentivising both foreign and local investment, locking the 
existing owners into owning firms that they value less highly than alternative potential owners 
and thereby depressing the firms‘ long-term economic performance and value, the detriments 
of which accrue to their existing owners.  
 
The design and application of the Act thus imposes substantial disincentives to both foreign 
investment in New Zealand firms, and New Zealand investment in firms that might ultimately 
be sold to foreign interests. These disincentives will be reflected in lower prices paid for New 
Zealand assets (both businesses and sensitive land) when they are traded, less frequent 
transacting in the market for such assets, and fewer firms created in New Zealand where 
sensitive assets may be involved. 
 
Widening the scope of benefits considered in assessing foreign purchase proposals to include 
private gains to New Zealand shareholders and allowing sales to proceed when the likely 
benefits to New Zealand are not negative (rather than strictly positive) will result in a better 
alignment of the incentives for both buyers and sellers to engage in welfare-enhancing trade 
of shares and improved capital markets performance, whilst still precluding investment where 
this would clearly be deleterious to the national economic interest. Bringing economic tests 
into line with standard cost-benefit analysis, including correct specification of the 
counterfactual and non-arbitrary weighting of costs and benefits would reduce the probability 
of welfare-reducing decision being made, improve the transparency and predictability of the 
Act and reduce transaction costs. 
 
Such changes, however, do not address the fundamental conflict between policies seeking 
increased foreign investment for economic purposes, and the application of the Overseas 
Investment Act for the largely non-economic purpose of retaining New Zealand control of 
narrow classes of assets, such as those described as ―strategic infrastructure‖. If ongoing New 
Zealand control of these assets is considered essential to the national interest, then regardless 
of the economic consequences that this may impose, it may be more appropriate to explicitly 
separate out such assets for consideration under separate, explicit ownership controls. This 
would allow the Overseas Investment Act to be more appropriately and explicitly directed 
towards national economic imperatives with respect to the very much larger class of non-
strategic infrastructure assets.  
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Overseas Investment:  
is New Zealand ‘Open for Business’? 
 
1. Introduction 
In March 2009 the New Zealand government announced that a review would be undertaken 
on the Overseas Investment Act 2005 (OIA)
1
. The review follows the high-profile Ministerial 
decision in 2008 which denied the shareholders of Auckland International Airport (AIA) 
permission to sell shares to the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB). The AIA 
decision has been the subject of much criticism, generating many suggested changes to the 
OIA (e.g. Chapman Tripp, 2009; The Treasury, 2009; Simpson Grierson, 2009; Hanson, 
2008; Capital Market Development Taskforce, 2009). 
 
This paper considers the basis of New Zealand‘s foreign investment controls by analysing the 
economic objectives of pursuing overseas
2
 investment, the reasons why a sovereign 
government may wish to intervene in overseas investment transactions, and the content and 
application of New Zealand‘s OIA as a means of governing the overseas investment process 
in the pursuit of economic objectives. The paper begins (Section 2) by addressing the property 
rights associated with the ownership of shares in companies, the motivations for owners to 
trade the shares, the economic reasons why a sovereign government might want to place 
restrictions upon the sale of shares to foreign investors or prevent foreign investment in start-
up ventures and the appropriate tests and benchmarks that should be applied to determine 
whether a proposed transaction will likely result in net economic benefits. Section 3 examines 
the provisions of the New Zealand OIA, and their consistency with the economic expectations 
for such legislation. Section 4 examines the application of the OIA in relation to four recent 
cases: the AIA-CPPIB transaction, the sale of Vector Wellington Electricity Network to 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure (CKI), the proposed sale of New Zealand Steel Mining Limited 
to CKI and the purchase of a small section of farm land near Taihape. These cases enable 
assessment of the consistency of the application of the Act with both its conceptual objectives 
and its specific provisions.  
 
The analysis indicates that the New Zealand OIA and its associated processes are not well-
aligned with the objective of enabling foreign investment with the purpose of increasing New 
                                                   
1
 http://beehive.govt.nz/release/government+simplify+foreign+investment+rules. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
2
 The terms ―overseas‖ and ―foreign‖ are synonymous in the context of an island nation such as New Zealand. The terms are used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
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Zealand‘s economic potential or actual economic performance (Section 5). Rather, the 
starting point for the Act is the presumption that it is a privilege for overseas persons to 
participate in the ownership and control of ―sensitive‖ New Zealand assets. Consequently, the 
OIA is concerned principally with managing the process via which individual overseas 
persons are allowed to invest in a subset of assets deemed ―sensitive‖, rather than taking 
account of the wider economic implications of the transaction for the national economy. 
Moreover, different standards are applied to screening investments depending on the size and 
other characteristics of any land associated with the asset. Whilst overseas purchasers of 
―significant‖ business assets are subject only to tests of their ―good‖ character, transactions 
involving the sale to foreign investors of land deemed ―sensitive‖ (or businesses with an 
interest in ―sensitive‖ land) are subject to a set of statutory and regulatory criteria of both an 
economic and non-economic nature.  
 
In practice sensitive-land sale transactions
3
 are allowed to proceed only if it is deemed, on the 
basis of an apparently narrow interpretation of the statutory and regulatory criteria, there is a 
net benefit to New Zealand. A peculiar feature of the ‗net benefit‘ calculation is the apparent 
exclusion from the assessment of gains that would accrue to private shareholders (either New 
Zealand or foreign) if the transaction proceeded. Successful applications must demonstrate the 
presence of other co-incidental (i.e. spill-over) benefits accruing to New Zealand in order to 
justify approval of the transaction. Consequently, transactions where the benefits accrue as 
purely private benefits to New Zealanders are not approved, even though the anticipated 
private benefits that must be forfeited when the transaction is denied may be very substantial. 
Furthermore, when the firm is already foreign-owned, the absence of both private New 
Zealand benefits and spill-over benefits accruing to New Zealand will preclude the granting 
of permission for a sale to proceed. Consequently, an unwilling foreign owner is locked into 
continued ownership of an asset more highly valued by another foreign party, even though 
there is no demonstrable net detriment to New Zealand from the transaction proceeding. The 
exclusion of private benefits from consideration results in the Act posing substantial 
disincentives for both foreign investment in New Zealand firms and New Zealand investment 
in firms that might in the future be sold to foreign interests. These disincentives will be 
reflected in lower land valuations and share prices and reduced liquidity in the market for 
shares in New Zealand firms, which of themselves are a net detriment to the New Zealand 
economy. 
                                                   
3
 The term ―sensitive-land transaction‖ in this report is used to mean a transaction subject to S.12 of the OIA. In simple terms, 
this includes the sale or long-term lease of land deemed sensitive (Schedule 1) , and/or the sale of an interest in a firm that owns 
or leases sensitive land. 
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Our analysis suggests that widening the scope of benefits considered in assessing foreign 
purchase proposals to include private gains to New Zealand owners and allowing sales to 
proceed when the gains to New Zealand are not negative (as opposed to the current test of 
strictly positive) will result in better incentives for both buyers and sellers to engage in 
welfare-enhancing trades and improved capital markets performance, whilst still precluding 
investments where this would clearly be deleterious to the national interest.  
 
It is acknowledged that there may be some assets which, for non-economic reasons, it may be 
undesirable for foreign entities to take a controlling interest (for example, iconic or historic 
New Zealand sites, strategic defence locations or other assets deemed sufficiently strategically 
important that foreign ownership is undesirable). If New Zealand ownership and/or control of 
these assets is sufficiently strategically important as to warrant specific exclusions from 
increased foreign ownership, it may be more appropriate to separate out such assets for 
consideration of separate, explicit ownership controls rather than applying the OIA to 
discourage such transactions on a case-by-case basis. Such separation of ―strategically 
important‖ assets from other tradeable assets would provide clarity for current and potential 
owners about which assets may be freely traded with foreign investors and which may not. 
Removing uncertainties about the nature and identity of these assets would allow the design 
and implementation of the Overseas Investment Act to be more appropriately and explicitly 
directed towards furthering national economic imperatives rather than addressing other, non-
economic, concerns.  
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2. Firm Ownership and Government Interest in Foreign Investment  
 
―Economic growth will occur if property rights make it worthwhile to undertake 
socially-productive activity‖ (North & Thomas, 1973). 
 
The institution of ownership, accompanied by secure property rights, is the most common and 
effective institution for providing incentives to create, maintain and improve assets (Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992). Assets have a bundle of legal rights attached to them, and all or a subset of 
rights may constitute ownership. However the concept of ownership as it is commonly used is 
associated with a bundle of property rights associated with an asset: to occupy and use the 
property (asset), to enjoy the income generated from the legally permitted uses of the 
property, to exclude others from using the property, and to transfer some or all of the property 
rights associated with the asset to other owners and for whatever consideration is available 
(Hansmann, 1988). In practice it is the last of these rights that most clearly defines ownership, 
since ownership can be retained even where use and exclusion rights are transferred, for 
example through a lease, or impaired by government action (Evans, Quigley & Counsell, 
2009). These principles apply regardless of the nature of the property concerned – be it a 
physical asset (e.g. land), an intangible asset (e.g. a patent) or a claim to an interest in a 
bundle of physical and/or intangible assets (e.g. shares in a firm).  
 
Statutory provisions in legislation can be used to create an additional property right, vested in 
a third party, granting that party the ability to restrict the extent to which the owners of the 
remaining rights can freely exercise the right to transfer any or all of the rights to whomsoever 
they choose, for whatever consideration is available. Effectively, the third party is granted an 
option (property right) to intervene in a transaction where specified rights are traded, taking 
away freedom of choice from the remaining rights-holders. Such impositions constitute a 
‗taking‘ that devalues the remaining rights compared to the counterfactual of unrestricted 
choice. The exercising of these rights by third parties thus has an unequivocally negative 
consequence for the remaining rights-holders. The use of executive power to create such 
third-party rights, and the exercising of the option to intervene that is created, has significant 
economic consequences for the holders of the remaining rights. Such power should therefore 
be used very sparingly and in full cognisance of its likely effects. A net gain from such 
intervention will accrue only when the intervention results in a gain sufficiently large to 
compensate the losers and leave all rights-holders in total no worse off than if the intervention 
had not occurred, and with compensation able to be paid to the losers in order to preserve the 
incentives for efficient investment in assets to which the property rights pertain (the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion - Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939).    
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2.1 Gains from trade 
When property rights are clearly defined and enforceable, and individuals are able to bargain 
together effectively and enforce their agreements, then the property rights will be exchanged 
in such a manner that they will end up being owned by the individuals whose ownership 
confers the greatest total economic value to society as a whole (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 
1985). No seller will willingly trade the rights unless the compensation paid exceeds the value 
placed on owning the right; no buyer will willingly pay a price higher than that at which he 
values owning the right
4
. Voluntary trade realises a welfare gain to society, as a buyer with a 
higher valuation of the asset pays a vendor with a lower valuation a price that exceeds the 
vendor‘s valuation. When buyers and sellers bargain freely, they will distribute the gains of 
trade between themselves in a mutually-agreed manner. The price struck leaves the buyer 
with a surplus measured by the difference between the value of the right owned by him and 
the price paid; the vendor‘s surplus is the difference between the price paid and her valuation 
of the right when owned by her.  
 
In most circumstances, the private gains from trade which accrue to the buyer and seller 
directly are the only consequences arising from the transaction. When buyers and sellers can 
freely trade, the economy as a whole will grow as buyers and sellers, with full information 
about the values they place upon owning the rights, will willingly engage in those trades that 
maximise their own personal positions. These principles underpin the concept of free trade 
(Smith, 1776; Samuelson, 1937).  
 
However, it may be that the transaction imposes additional costs or benefits upon third parties 
(externalities) that are not taken into account by the buyer and seller when deciding to 
transact
5
. Two cases warrant attention: 
 If the external benefits are large, but there is no private benefit to either the buyer or 
the seller, then even though it would be desirable from the wider economic 
perspective for the transaction to go ahead, the buyer and seller will not willingly 
interact. Intervention may be necessary to enact the trade for the net benefit to be 
yielded. 
                                                   
4
 This principle was first described by Aristole (Soudek, 1952). 
5
 Positive externalities (or spill-over benefits) are benefits that accrue to third parties as a result of a transaction, for example 
access to improved infrastructure. Similarly negative externalities are costs imposed on third parties, for example increased noise 
or pollution. 
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 If the private benefits are substantial enough to motivate the parties to trade, but the 
transaction imposes external costs that exceed the sum of the private and external 
benefits, then unless the trade is prevented, the total size of the economy (net welfare) 
will decrease. For example, a transaction resulting in the creation of market power 
that will unequivocally be exercised to the detriment of consumers would require 
intervention (e.g. the use of merger control regulations) to prevent a net loss to 
society.  
 
It is the second of these cases that is of interest in the context of inward foreign investment.  
 
2.2 Criteria for Government intervention 
Governments are typically charged with furthering the economic interests of their nations. At 
the very least, governments seeking to ensure that the economies in their stewardship have the 
best possible opportunities to grow as a consequence of welfare-enhancing trades have a 
legitimate role in protecting property rights and the ability of rights-holders to freely trade 
with each other. Generally, the interests of both individuals and governments are served best 
when governments provide a sound and secure legal framework via which such trades can be 
conducted, and refrain from intervening in individual transactions. However, governments 
may deem it legitimate to grant themselves the right to intervene in private trades when it is 
clear that the external costs exceed the sum of private plus external benefits. Intervention 
could take one of two approaches
6
: 
(a) screen proposed transactions and block proposals assessed to have negative 
outcomes; or 
(b) identify transactions which caused negative outcomes, and reverse those transactions 
or otherwise act to ameliorate the outcomes. 
 
If the reversal of transactions or amelioration of effects is likely to be difficult then a 
transaction screening mechanism is indicated. 
 
Where both the buyer and seller are subjects of the same government and all of the external 
effects pertain solely to the economy stewarded by that government, the legitimate exertion of 
intervention rights when the costs clearly exceed the benefits is generally uncontroversial. 
However, national economies are very rarely closed systems. Buyers and sellers may be 
subjects of different sovereign governments and both the positive and negative externalities 
                                                   
6
 A third approach is to implement taxes or other policies in such as way as the private parties internalise external costs in their 
decision-making. To the extent this approach is successful, intervention in individual transactions will be unnecessary.  
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arising from trade may impact differently upon the economies of the countries of the traders 
concerned or even have a material effect upon unrelated economies. When at least one of the 
parties to the transaction is not a subject of the government in question, the possibility arises 
of the transaction having a net negative consequence upon the economy over which that 
government has stewardship. A prudent government wishing to be satisfied that these 
circumstances do not arise may implement a transaction screening mechanism. The question 
emerges of what factors a government should take into account when assessing the costs and 
benefits of a proposed transaction and making the decision of whether or not to intervene in 
an agreement to trade reached, in unconstrained circumstances, between the private parties. 
Evans (2004) makes the case for total surplus (economic efficiency) being the appropriate 
criterion to be applied.  
 
As a government is charged with the stewardship of the economy of only its own state, then 
the relevant costs and benefits to consider are those affecting only the economic interests of 
that state
7
 – expressed as the cumulative interests of its subjects, both individual and 
corporate, and externalities arising from the transaction. The relevant private benefits and 
costs arising from the trade are those pertaining specifically to the state‘s residents (individual 
and corporate) involved in the transaction. When a resident purchases an asset from a non-
resident (e.g. purchase of an imported good) then the surplus enjoyed by that resident (benefit 
received net of price paid) enters the local economy as a positive benefit. When a resident 
sells an asset to a foreign party (e.g. an export sale, or foreign investment in a New Zealand 
capital asset) the private surplus (sale price net of cost of production) likewise enters the local 
economy as a positive benefit. The relevant external benefits and costs to the subject 
economy are those that impinge upon either its physical territory (i.e. land) or non-transacting 
residents (individual or corporate) separate from the private benefits enjoyed by the 
transacting parties. The relevant social benefits and costs are the sums of the relevant private 
and external benefits and costs respectively. 
 
If the effect of externalities on the local economy is positive or neutral, then regardless of the 
size or locus of the private benefits, there would appear to be no justification for intervention, 
as there is no harm done to the local economy as a consequence of the transaction proceeding 
that would justify government intervention (providing it can be assumed that residents do not 
willingly engage in trades that for whatever reason lead to personal losses).  
                                                   
7
 Concerns for ‗fair trade‘ and overseas development may create an interest within a country for consideration of the costs and 
benefits incurred in other countries as a result of foreign investment transactions. Such concerns are more relevant to outward 
foreign investment and thus outside the scope of this paper. 
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This leaves as candidates for intervention only those cases where the transaction imposes a 
net external cost on the local economy. However, a net external cost is of itself insufficient to 
prevent the transaction from occurring without considering the extent to which private gains 
may exceed the external costs. If the magnitude of the net external cost to the local economy 
exceeds the net gains accrued by transacting residents, then it is in the interests of the local 
economy for the transaction to be prevented
8
. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion suggests the 
transaction should proceed, as the local economy post-trade is still larger than pre-trade local 
economy.  Within the restricted local economy those making private gains could, in principle, 
compensate the losers and still be better off. To prevent a transaction from occurring simply 
because a net negative externality exists imposes a much stricter test – that the transaction 
must leave at least one set of residents better off (i.e. the resident transacting party) but no 
other residents less well-off (i.e. those bearing the cost of the externality, even though they are 
not parties to the transaction), regardless of the feasibility of the ‗winners‘ being able to 
compensate the ‗losers‘.  
 
If it were possible to measure the incidence of loss incurred, and feasible for the ‗winners‘ to 
make a compensatory transfer to the ‗losers‘, then it is welfare-enhancing for the transaction 
to proceed, regardless of the presence of the negative externality per se. However, 
measurability and the nature of the gains and losses mean that such transfers are not always 
feasible. In such cases, the government may deem it desirable to prevent the transaction in 
order to avoid creating losers who cannot be compensated. However, in intervening to prevent 
the transaction from occurring, losers are inevitably created in the form of those who would 
have received private gains had the transaction proceeded. Such interventions thus have an 
explicit distributional motivation – in effect a ‗taking‘ from the prospective ‗winners‘ (gains 
foregone) in order to avoid a loss imposed upon the prospective ‗losers‘.  
 
It is noted that whilst in principle the assessment of costs and benefits appears 
straightforward, in practice it is made more complex by the ability to obtain the necessary 
information to make an accurate assessment, the uncertainties associated with likely and/or 
merely possible future outcomes and the extent to which the relevant costs and benefits may 
affect individual residents differently and thereby influence the incentives facing the decision-
makers. Any or all of these factors may result in a less-than-optimal assessment, leading to 
decisions that prevent the national economy realising its full potential.  
                                                   
8
 Although it is noted that such a stance violates the principles of free trade across borders as it ignores the private benefit to the 
foreign transactor – free trade being aligned with the maximisation of the universal economy. 
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Box 1 contains a summary of the costs and benefits in cross-border transactions. 
 
Box 1. Summary of costs and benefits in cross-border transactions 
A. Private
Local
B. Private
Overseas
C. External
Local
D. External
Overseas
Total welfare
L
o
c
a
l 
w
e
lf
a
re
G
a
in
s
 fro
m
 tra
d
e
 
 
Costs and benefits can be classified by who they affect: parties who are part of the transaction 
(private) and those who are not (external). They can also be classified by geographic locus: 
within the territory concerned (local) and outside that territory (overseas). The blue boxes above 
represent the four combinations of these classifications. 
 
A transaction will voluntarily occur if the private benefits (gains from trade) for both vendor 
and purchaser are greater than zero (boxes A and B).  
The transaction will be welfare-enhancing in total if social benefits (private plus external) 
exceed social costs (boxes A-D). 
 
From the perspective of the local territory, a transaction will be locally welfare enhancing if 
benefits accrued locally exceed costs incurred locally (boxes A and C). 
 
The threshold for consideration of local screening is reached if external costs incurred locally 
exceed external benefits accrued locally (box C). However, if local benefits exceed local costs 
(boxes A and C), the transaction should be allowed to proceed (using the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion), as the private ‗winners‘ can theoretically compensate the external ‗losers‘ and still be 
better off than if the transaction had not occurred. 
 
An ideal overseas investment screening test should block only those transactions that result in a 
reduction of welfare for those within its territory, i.e. if (BLP - CLP) + (BLE – CLE) < 0.  
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2.3 Transaction efficiencies 
If government intervention is justified in order to avoid potential adverse consequences, then 
the question arises as to what is the most appropriate mechanism for intervention. 
Mechanisms available to restrict foreign investment include monopoly government ownership 
of specific sectors (e.g. the electricity transmission grid in New Zealand), restrictions on the 
proportion of shares in locally-listed companies that can be owned by foreign investors (as 
has applied in the past in Finland), restrictions on the identities of land owners, and control 
rights held by governments and written into the constitutions of companies (e.g. Air New 
Zealand). Broad screening mechanisms on investment transactions such as the Overseas 
Investment Act have the advantage of being comprehensive and difficult to avoid, and may be 
appropriate when it is difficult to determine in advance the sectors in which adverse 
consequences will occur.  
 
Screening mechanisms do create delays and transaction costs and increase uncertainty for all 
participants. These costs are incurred for transactions whether approved or declined, and are a 
real cost to the economy. Costs can be significantly reduced if the process is transparent, 
criteria clear and outcomes predictable, including rights of appeal and review
9
. A well-
designed screening process should exhibit these characteristics. 
 
2.4 Incentive effects of interventions 
Whilst the appropriate criterion for government interest in a transaction is the presence of 
external costs to the economy in question, interest should lead to intervention only in that 
subset of cases where the net external costs exceed the net private benefits (Box 1). It is 
therefore critical to the assessment that the full range of costs and benefits and their locus of 
effect be identified. Failure to include the full extent of the private benefits may lead to too 
much intervention, with negative consequences for the size of the national economy.  
 
Assume, for example, only external costs and benefits are considered when the government 
makes a decision to intervene (i.e. private benefits are ignored) in a transaction where a 
resident sells shares in a local firm to a foreign investor. The foreigner is the person with the 
highest value of the shares; all other potential purchasers, both local and foreign, value the 
shares much lower than the foreigner
10
. A transaction with very large private benefits and 
                                                   
9
 Rights of appeal and review will, over time, increase the transparency and predictability of the application of a law.  
10
 There are a number of reasons why a foreigner might have the highest valuation of the shares. These include opportunities for  
diversification (Ariff & Khan, 1998), or simply that given a random distribution of valuations, the holder of the highest valuation 
is most likely to be from outside a small economy. Reasons for wanting to purchase 100% control of a business include vertica l 
integration (Hart, 1989), economies of scale and scope, and control of assets for strategic purposes.  
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very small external costs will be prevented from occurring, even though the net effect would 
have been substantially positive for the local economy.  
 
Vetoing a transaction to sell to a foreign investor simply because there are no external 
benefits accruing to that territory will have a depressing effect on the expected returns to 
residents from investing in assets in that territory in all future investment decisions 
undertaken. A government veto signals that the local owner can expect to deal with only the 
highest-valuing resident of the same territory when any future decision is made to sell the 
asset. Due to the necessarily smaller subset of candidate purchasers, the return from this 
future transaction will be smaller than that obtainable from selling in the open market. Thus, 
the expected value of the shares transacted in the local market will be lower than if they can 
be freely traded with all prospective purchasers. This is consistent with observations that 
otherwise identical shares which can be sold to foreign investors trade at a significant 
premium above those which can only be sold to domestic investors in Finland (Hietala, 1989), 
Thailand (Choi & Clovutivat, 2004) and other countries (Bailey, Chung & Kang, 1999). A 
reduction in a firm‘s share price increases its cost of capital, raising the hurdle rate for new 
productive investments by that firm. This could be expected to inhibit investment by local 
firms. 
 
Furthermore, it is also likely that the returns from the future sale will be less than the return 
available from other investment opportunities available to a local resident with funds to 
invest. Consequently, local investors may eschew purchasing shares in local firms – favouring 
offshore opportunities that offer greater expected returns. Both returns and liquidity in the 
local share market are consequentially reduced. 
 
Moreover, the incentive for local residents to create firms in the local economy will be 
substantially reduced, with the effect being greater the more likely it is that the highest 
valuing potential buyer for the shares in a future trade is foreign. All else equal, the firm 
founder will prefer to establish the firm in an economy where asset trading is less restrictive. 
Economic benefits arising from that firm are forfeited by the local economy: there will be 
fewer local firms than if the foreign investment restriction was less severe. 
 
2.5 Uncertainty and assessment of intervention 
When assessments are made of the effects of a transaction, there will necessarily be 
uncertainties involved regarding the magnitude of the gains and losses occurring. As all 
transactions are made on the basis of the expected costs and benefits over a future time 
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horizon, the actual outcome will depend upon factors that cannot be anticipated or controlled 
by either party (e.g. worldwide financial conditions, physical disasters such as earthquakes).  
 
Both the expected costs and benefits, and their variances, must be taken into account, in order 
to determine a realistic expected value and the probability of it being realised.  
 
2.6 Choice of counterfactual 
When making an assessment of the effects of an intervention, it is important that the base case 
against which the transaction is assessed is selected appropriately.  The simple fact of 
proposing a transaction has an important informational effect that alters expectations of all 
parties as to the value of an asset.  If the transaction proceeds, the vendor will accrue gains 
equal to the difference between the price paid and reservation value. Likewise, making a 
decision to prevent the transaction occurring alters the information available to current and 
potential future owners of the expected value of the asset.  A rejection signals that the set of 
potential future purchasers of the asset is constrained to exclude foreigners, consequently 
lowering the price that remaining interested purchasers may be willing to pay.   
 
1. Status quo
2. Application 
received
3b. Rejected
3a. Accepted
Past    Future
 
Figure 1. State diagram for screening process decision-making 
 
The importance of choosing the appropriate set of values upon which to base the assessment 
of the transaction‘s costs and benefits (the counterfactual) is illustrated in Figure 1. Once an 
application is received and a decision is pending (the dotted line in Figure 1), decision-makers 
are logically tasked with deciding on the better of two alternatives: rejection or acceptance. 
This is true even if both of those states are themselves worse than the original status quo – 
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that state is now ―sunk‖ in the sense that it can never be regained.  The appropriate reference 
point (counterfactual) for the calculation of the relevant costs and benefits upon which to base 
the decision is not the status quo that prevailed before the application was received (as this 
state is past and can never be recovered) but the rejection of the application, as this is the state 
that will actually prevail.   
 
2.7 Externalities and land 
A sovereign government may take a greater interest in transactions that involve land 
physically located within its jurisdiction than those where land is not involved. It is 
understandable that such a view may be taken because, regardless of the identity of the 
transacting parties, the land remains within the local economy. A particular concern pertains 
to externalities associated with foreign control of the land. These may be uncertain at the time 
of the transaction, but could come to pass in the future. The externalities concerned are those 
that pertain strictly to the ‗foreign‘ identity of the ownership and control interest11, and not 
those that may arise regardless of the identity of the owner (for example, changes in 
technology enable new uses for the land to emerge that make the land subsequently more 
valuable to the new owner, but which being unforeseen were not factored into the price paid 
to the vendor
12
). Furthermore, they must be genuine externalities and not simply the creation 
of a means to limit the rights of foreign owners to change the use of the land in response to 
changing economic circumstances, which are more appropriately managed by other land use 
restrictions that operate without regard to the identity of the owners. Changes in land use are 
more appropriately controlled by resource management and local body consenting processes 
than by an overseas investment screening mechanism.  
 
As the land cannot be moved from the territory, the externality risks associated with its 
‗foreign ownership‘ may not be easily diversified away from the local economy. This could 
become an issue, for example, where there is a shared complementary asset associated with 
land (such as a brand), and an increased risk that foreign owners might undertake behaviour 
that damaged that complementary asset. This arguably applies in the case of dairy farms in 
New Zealand (see Box 2). 
                                                   
11
 While the authors had some difficulty in thinking of an example of such an externality, The Treasury (2004) provides the 
following observation: ―overseas investors can create domestic problems if they behave in a manner that is inconsistent with 
domestic behavioural norms, even if such behaviour is not illegal. Examples of such behaviour may include restricting access 
across a property where it has been traditionally granted.‖ (p.15) A further example is discussed in Box 2. 
12
 It is noted that historically, sovereign governments have used their legislative powers to create monopsonies that have enabled 
their purchase of land at less than the fair market price, for example the Crown purchase of Maori land in colonial New Zealand 
(Evans, Counsell & Quigley, 2009; Boast, 2008). 
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Box 2. Externalities and the ownership of New Zealand dairy farms 
The dairy farming industry provides a possible example of undiversifiable externality risks 
associated with land ownership. A purchaser of a dairy farm is also purchasing a stake in a 
complementary asset: the New Zealand dairy brand with associated values of product quality and 
(relatively) clean production. While presumably the purchase price paid will include a capitalised 
premium reflecting the value of this brand, there may be an incentive for a reduction in product 
quality or production standards that generates a private benefit greater than the private loss from 
a reduction in the owner‘s share of the complementary asset. This is the incentive structure that 
creates the ‗Tragedy of the Commons‘ for common-pool resources described by Hardin (1968). 
Degradation of the NZ dairy brand would concern the government as the dairy sector is a large 
and important part of the economy and an important contributor to the overall ‗Brand New 
Zealand‘. An adverse impact on the dairy brand could thus have spill-over costs in other 
agricultural sectors and the tourism industry. The government has a stewardship role over the 
country‘s brand, and associated risks are difficult to diversify. 
 
However, both local and overseas owners may face incentives to degrade the brand. Regulation 
of minimum standards for animal husbandry, environmental protection and integrity of the food 
production chain are an important counter to these incentives, and to the extent that such 
regulation is effective it will mitigate brand risks regardless of owner nationality. Brand 
degradation incentives are likely to be stronger for investors with shorter investment horizons, 
those with a smaller stake in the New Zealand economy as a whole and those who feel reduced 
pressure to conform to societal norms. If those factors are more applicable to overseas investors 
than local ones, and the potential externality damage is significant, then there may be grounds for 
screening proposed overseas investments in dairy farms. Under these circumstances, the 
government should look more favourably on larger, longer-term investments relative to smaller, 
shorter-term ones. 
 
Making assumptions about future behaviour based on the identity of an owner is a form of 
discrimination, and inappropriate and counter-productive discrimination may occur from a desire 
to keep a common-pool resource in local ownership (Ostrom, 1999). It may be equally valid to 
assume that foreign owners are more likely to have knowledge of local demand factors in key 
overseas markets, relationships that enable entry into new markets, and experience with farming 
techniques that could be profitably applied in New Zealand.  
 
Overseas ownership of New Zealand farms could thus generate both positive and negative 
externalities, and it would be unwise for decision-makers to jump to conclusions without further 
detailed consideration of each specific proposal. 
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Whilst these uncertainties may result in either positive or negative consequences, an 
extremely risk-averse government could be concerned that the possible negative externalities 
associated with foreign ownership of the land, if they should come to pass, may be untenable. 
This may lead such a government to veto all transactions where there is even a small 
probability of such an eventuality occurring at some time in the future, regardless of the 
possible positive consequences that might otherwise be realised. However, if such an 
approach is taken, both certain private gains and possible positive private gains and 
externalities are ruled out, and the investment incentive, share price and liquidity 
consequences outlined in Section 2.4 will arise. This appears to be a very large price to pay 
for avoiding what may be only a relatively small eventual externality cost. Furthermore, it 
appears inconsistent with the approach taken by governments in respect of other risks to the 
national economy
13
. Governments routinely assume residual risks that are uninsurable in the 
private sector in order to stimulate increases in overall national economic activity (e.g. 
earthquake insurance, and government guarantees for trading banks offered in the recent 
economic crisis). This occurs because governments are able to spread the cost of bearing the 
risk across all residents, rather than imposing the costs of risk management solely upon the 
existing asset owners.  
 
To refuse to allow a transaction to proceed because of government risk aversion would appear 
to be justified only when the possible maximum loss from externalities is larger than even the 
government (as represented by the aggregate of its residents) could bear. In practical terms 
very few cross-border transactions would meet this threshold. Thus for most purposes, the test 
of expected private benefits exceeding expected external costs would appear to be sufficient 
to protect governments from the consequences of undiversifiable risks associated with 
transactions including land.  
 
2.8 Profit Repatriation 
A commonly voiced concern about overseas investment is that profits generated as a 
consequence are likely to be repatriated offshore (e.g. Cunliffe, 2010).  However, this concern 
is not founded upon rational economic analysis, and therefore should not be considered as a 
‗negative externality‘ arising from the foreign investment. Under normal economic 
circumstances, future potential profit expectations are fully internalised into the purchase 
                                                   
13
 The optimal allocation of risk depends on the type of risk. Controllable risks are best borne by the party who can take action to 
reduce the risk to an efficient level. Truly random risks are best borne collectively, and where the whole of society is affected 
government is the appropriate institution to bear the risk (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).   
- 16 - 
 
price accepted by the local asset vendor.   The local resident will sell the asset only if the price 
paid reflects a greater return on the capital investment arises from sale than is on offer from 
continuing to own the asset – that is, the local owner has other, more highly-valued 
opportunities to apply the capital released by sale than is available from ongoing ownership.  
The net result of the sale is therefore increased local economic benefit, regardless of the 
nationality of the purchaser.  Repatriated profits (taken as dividends or a capital gain 
following sale of the asset) are simply the reward that incentivises capital purchase and 
enhancement by a foreign owner whose specific characteristics enable more efficient use of 
(greater productivity from) that asset than the local owner.  Without profit as an incentive, 
there will be reduced competition in product and ownership markets and substantially less 
innovation. 
 
2.9 Should firms with market power be treated differently? 
Some commentators have suggested that sovereign governments may take a different view of 
foreign investment in firms that are able to exert significant market power in the local 
economy from that in firms transacting in more competitive markets (e.g. Shearer & 
Thirlwell, 2008). The owners of firms with market power are in a position to charge prices in 
excess of costs. These monopoly rents remain in the local economy when the firm‘s owners 
are local residents, but will leave the local economy when the firm is purchased by foreign 
investors
14
. It may be argued that foreign ownership of firms with market power thus leads to 
an unequivocal cost to the local economy, so transactions leading to such an outcome should 
be prevented.  
 
However, a cost-benefit assessment (CBA) of the proposed transaction should take account of 
both the costs and benefits arising. A rational local owner will consider the future earning 
potential of the assets when setting the price at which he is willing to sell. He will not sell 
unless the price received compensates him for the foregone monopoly rents. Thus not only do 
the rents not leave the local economy, they are also capitalised with certainty immediately, 
rather than being realised over time and therefore becoming subject to currently unforeseeable 
uncertainties that could impair their magnitude (such as innovation, increased competition or 
potential future regulation).  This implies that firms with market power should not be treated 
                                                   
14
 A related issue arises with the ownership of un-moveable assets that enable lower-cost production. Don Argus, the chairman of 
BHP Billiton, describes such assets (e.g. mineral resources) as ‗endowment assets‘ and argues that the rents from such assets 
should be retained in the local economy (Stevens, 2009). Arguably this is a resource-pricing issue rather than a foreign 
investment issue. Governments, as owners of the endowment assets, should set royalty rates so as to capture the rents from 
endowment assets directly rather than preferring to gift those rents to a local firm. 
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differently to firms without such power by a foreign investment screening process
15
. Only if 
there are other externalities pertaining to the transaction that result in the social costs 
outweighing social gains
16
 should intervention be indicated.  
 
2.10 Should investments by foreign governments be treated differently? 
Over the past 15 years there has been a substantial rise in the amount of foreign investment 
activity by foreign governments via Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) or state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Hansen, 2008; Mogg, 2008). Concerns that investors with links to foreign 
governments may not operate solely in accordance with normal commercial considerations 
and may instead pursue broader political or strategic objectives prompted the Australian 
Government in 2008 to adopt tougher rules for the screening of such investments than for 
comparable investments from commercial entities
17
.  
 
There are also concerns about the accounting transparency of such organisations. Poor 
transparency may create conditions under which it is more difficult to detect transfer pricing 
or other tactics to reduce tax payable in the host country. This issue could be effectively 
addressed using a screening test on the identity of a foreign investor; however any such test 
for accounting transparency should logically be applied to all investors rather than specifically 
to SWFs or foreign SOEs. 
 
2.11 Non-economic reasons for intervention 
Economic analysis suggests that, in general, the appropriate policy towards overseas 
investment is neutrality, neither favouring nor discriminating against foreign investors 
(Golub, 2003). Nonetheless a wide variety of concerns persist about loss of national 
sovereignty, perceptions of ‗excessive‘ foreign control over those assets and adverse effects 
on national security. Such concerns have led many OECD countries to impose specific 
restrictions on foreign ownership in those sectors considered to be most sensitive, typically 
defence, telecommunications, air and sea transport, finance and the media.  
 
                                                   
15
 The Commerce Act 1986 should mute the excessive use of market power by firms operating in New Zealand. An Overseas 
Investment Act should concern itself only with potential behaviour that will not be caught by the Commerce Act. 
16
 For example, if the foreign purchaser has market power in respect of the investment transaction itself (e.g. a monopsony 
purchaser who can set the sale transaction price so that it is not truly a ‗freely negotiated‘ trade) then there will be no local vendor 
gain from the sale, and the rents will exit the local economy. However, under a well-functioning overseas investment process, the 
economic assessment of the sale should detect the net cost to the local economy and invoke steps for preventing the transaction 
proceeding.  
17
 http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/009.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&DocType=0. 
Accessed 2 June 2010. 
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Non-economic concerns relating to specific sensitive sectors are best dealt with via targeted 
mechanisms rather than a broad investment screening mechanism. In particular, it may be that 
the investment transaction is not the most appropriate point of intervention to achieve the 
desired goal. For example, the Australian Airports Act 1996 places a series of restrictions on 
the ownership of airports: 
 a 49% limit on foreign ownership; 
 a 5% limit on airline ownership; 
 a 15% limit on cross-ownership for Sydney/Melbourne, Sydney/Brisbane and 
Sydney/Perth airports; 
 the central management and control of an airport-operator must be exercised at a 
place in Australia; and 
 A majority of directors of an airport-operator company must be Australian citizens 
and/or residents
18
. 
 
These firm-specific restrictions are in the forms of outcomes, which could not be effectively 
achieved via a foreign investment screening mechanism.  
 
If there are to be restrictions on the freedom to trade interests in specific firms, then such 
restrictions should be explicit and transparent before any transactions are contemplated. With 
clarity and transparency around these restrictions, the likelihood that negotiations for 
exchange will begin in good faith based upon the economic consequences of the transaction, 
but then become subject to uncertainties surrounding the likelihood of approval being denied 
on the basis of subsequent non-economic considerations overriding the economic ones is 
much lower.  
 
2.12 Political economy considerations 
It is noted, however, that as a consequence of the political processes that determine the 
appointment of those overseeing and executing government powers, there could be direct 
personal political risks to the appointed decision-making agents arising from specific 
decisions that are not easily diversifiable. This leads to a conflict between the decision-makers 
as agents of their political principals and their role as custodians and stewards (agents) of the 
national economy (where the principal is the collective national citizenry) (Buchanan, 1994; 
Horn, 1995). When such conflicts arise, the decision-makers will most likely prioritise the 
agency that provides them with the greatest personal return (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). 
                                                   
18
 See https://secure.dotars.gov.au/webforms/infopages/Ownership_control_airports_overview.htm and 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/overseasinvestment/pdfs/t2008-297.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
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Thus, it is plausible that some intervention decisions may ultimately reflect short term 
political interests rather than long-term economic considerations. Those decisions associated 
with land-based assets may be more likely to invoke such attention, simply because of the 
inability to diversify away the political consequences of electorally unpopular, but 
economically rational choices.  
 
2.13 Summary 
A principled overseas investment screening mechanism should be focused upon maximising 
the economic efficiency of the local economy. To further this objective, such an Act should 
grant the sovereign government the ability to examine transactions between its residents and 
foreign parties, or between foreign owners of local assets. If, upon examination, it is assessed 
that there is an expected net negative consequence upon the territorial economy if the 
transaction proceeds, then a legitimate power may be granted to the government to prevent 
the transaction from proceeding. 
 
There are costs to the local economy of such a mechanism, even if well-designed and 
efficiently implemented. It is therefore prudent to exclude from consideration all transactions 
(or classes of transactions) where the risks of negative outcomes are small or easily 
diversifiable. 
 
This Section has presented a framework of factors to consider in the design and operation of 
an optimal overseas investment screening mechanism aimed at increasing the economic 
potential of a country. The key characteristics of the framework are summarised in Table 1. 
Sections 3 and 4 examine the New Zealand Overseas Investment Act and contrast it with this 
framework. 
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Table 1. Summary of conceptual framework for an overseas investment screening mechanism 
Criteria Conceptual model 
External costs and benefits examined All that accrue in within local territory or to local 
citizens 
Private costs and benefits examined All that accrue in within local territory or to local 
citizens 
Weighting of factors Equal weighting in monetary terms  
Treatment of uncertainty Incorporated into cost-benefit assessment based 
on probability of occurrence 
Decision criteria Net benefits neutral or positive 
Decision criteria: transactions between 
foreign parties 
Suitability of new investors 
Counterfactual Refusal of application 
Non-economic criteria Achieved via other mechanisms 
Transparency of process High 
Clarity of criteria High 
Predictability of outcome High 
Transaction costs for applicants As low as feasible 
Treatment of transactions where the 
risks are small or easily diversifiable 
Not screened 
Suitability of foreign investors Applicants meet equivalent criteria to what would 
be required of a local owner, including accounting 
transparency 
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3. The Overseas Investment Act 2005 
The New Zealand government‘s approach to the trading of assets between New Zealand 
citizens and foreign investors can be assessed using the framework developed in the 
preceding Section. The governing legislation is the Overseas Investment Act 2005. Its 
processes are administered by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO)
19
, a division of the 
government department Land Information New Zealand
20
. The Act has a strong focus on the 
ownership of land, which is best understood in light of the history of the Act (see Box 3). 
 
When the OIA was reviewed in 2003, the government stated that it ―was committed to 
maintaining a liberal investment regime because New Zealand needed foreign capital if it was 
to return to the top half of the OECD and to develop the economy to its fullest potential‖.21 
This suggests that the government‘s intention was to encourage growth of the local economy. 
From Section 2 it might be expected that its citizens are supported in the free trade of land and 
corporate assets with foreign entities, except in the limited circumstances where it is assessed 
that there is a net cost to the New Zealand economy. Assessments would be expected to 
balance the social gains accruing to New Zealanders against social costs, with certain gains 
accruing being weighted more highly than uncertain losses.  
 
The government‘s clearly-articulated objective has not been translated into the purpose and 
principles of the relevant Act. The stated purpose of the OIA is ―to acknowledge that it is a 
privilege for overseas persons to own or control sensitive New Zealand assets‖22. 
Consequently the thresholds for government intervention focus strongly upon the nature of 
the assets subject to transactions between New Zealanders and foreign investors, and the 
definition of what constitutes a ‗foreign ownership interest‘ in an asset rather than upon 
economic objectives. The statutory processes for assessing transactions of interest therefore 
subjugate economic consequences of the transaction to considerations of the assets in question 
and the identity of the foreign investors.  
 
 
                                                   
19
 http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/index.aspx. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
20
 http://www.linz.govt.nz/about-linz/index.aspx. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
21 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/1st+principles+review+overseas+investment+act. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
22
 S.3 
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Box 3. A short history of the Overseas Investment Act 2005 
 
Legislation to control land ownership – in particular the ownership of farm land – has a long 
pedigree in New Zealand. While policy from 1840-1853 was directed at restricting the disposal 
of Crown Land, this changed in the 1850s to the promotion of land settlement and by the mid-
1860s leases were taken up for all available pastoral land. However, inconsistent application by 
some provincial governments and blatant political favouritism by others resulted in large tracts 
in some provinces coming under the control of a small number of run holders (notably the South 
Island high country, Marlborough, Nelson and Hawkes Bay – Boast, 2008; McIntyre, 2008).  
Consequently, the Land Act 1877 introduced a nationwide policy of auctioning land leases. 
Leaseholders were required to reside on the land and make improvements. The main aim of 
legislation from the 1880s was ―closer settlement‖ – to assist small-scale farmers to settle on the 
land while discouraging the aggregation of land to an undesirable extent. Closer settlement was 
seen as a way of expanding production with an ideal social structure of family farm ownership 
(Fairweather, 1985).   
 
The twin goals of closer settlement and discouragement of undue aggregation are also apparent 
in the Land Settlement and Promotion Act 1952. Intending purchasers of farm land were 
required to sign a declaration that they did not already own land, or in the case that they did, to 
seek clearance to purchase from the Land Valuation Tribunal. The Act also required that 
purchasers of farms land reside on and farm the land. That requirement was later lifted. A 1968 
amendment introduced provisions to control acquisition of land by overseas corporations and 
persons who were not New Zealanders. 
 
The Overseas Investment Act 1973 created an Overseas Investment Commission whose role 
was to ―supervise and control‖ overseas investment in New Zealand. This Act was focused on 
investments in businesses and securities and the raising of debt, and was administered by the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand. In 1995 the Land Settlement Promotion and Land Acquisition 
Act 1952 was repealed and its provisions relating to foreign purchase of land were consolidated 
into the Overseas Investment Act (Treacy, 1995). 
 
The Overseas Investment Act 1973 was reviewed in 2003 and replaced by the Overseas 
Investment Act 2005. The 2005 Act is similar in intent and operation to the Act it replaced, 
however its administration was moved from the Reserve Bank to the newly created Overseas 
Investment Office located within Land Information New Zealand. 
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The OIA process requires approval to be sought in relation to acquisitions by overseas 
persons of 25% or more direct or indirect ownership and/or control of interests in: 
 significant business assets (new businesses and shares in existing businesses with 
assets in excess of $100 million
23
, or where the price paid for the shares exceeds 
$100 million); 
 sensitive land 24, defined as land purchase and any other interest (e.g. a lease) for 
a term of three years or more in: 
(a) any foreshore, seabed, lake bed, regional park, land reserve, land held 
for conservation purposes or subject to a heritage order; 
(b) any non-urban land in excess of 5 hectares; 
(c) any land in excess of 0.2 hectares adjoining the foreshore;  
(d) any land in excess of 0.4 hectares that adjoins a lake, reserve, 
heritage or conservation land (i.e. (a) above) or includes an historic 
place, area or wahi tapu
25
; or 
(e) any land on specific islands;  
 farm land; and  
 fishing quotas26. 
 
Under the OIA all decisions are made by the relevant government Ministers
27
.  However the 
Act provides for decision-making responsibility to be delegated to other persons (S.32). In 
practice it appears that decisions on the great majority of applications are made by the OIO. 
 
Figure 2 shows a simplified flowchart of the assessment process. It can be seen that the key 
decision points in the process are driven by the area of land involved in the transaction, and 
the characteristics of that land. 
 
                                                   
23
 All dollar amounts in this paper are in New Zealand dollars unless otherwise indicated. 
24
 This is a summary of the definition of ―sensitive land‖ in Schedule 1 of the Act. It is very broad and it can be expected tha t the 
majority of productive businesses in New Zealand would have an interest in land that meets one or more of these criteria. 
25
 Wahi tapu is defined in the Historic Places Act as sites and places sacred to Maori people in the traditional, religious, ritual or 
mythological sense. 
26 Consideration of fishing quotas is outside the scope of this paper. 
27
 The relevant Minister or Ministers for each decision is determined according to S.24(1). 
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Application received
Involves sensitive 
land?
Significant
business asset?
No
No
Does not require 
assessment
Application approved
Yes
Applicant is an 
overseas person?
No
Yes
Suitable person tests
Yes
Application declined
Fail
Citizen, resident or 
intending resident?
Pass
Benefit to NZ tests
No
Non-urban land
> 5ha?
Fail
Pass
Benefit substantial 
and identifiable?
Yes
No
Farm land?
No
No
Offered to non-
overseas persons?
Yes
NoYes
Yes
Person tests
Economic 
tests
Process tests
Yes
 
Figure 2. Simplified flowchart of the OIA assessment process. 
 
- 25 - 
 
The provisions in the OIA specifying how applications are assessed can be translated (see 
Appendix 1) into six types of test that are required to be performed (see Table 2). Broadly, the 
six test types can be categorised as assessing investor identity (test type 1), economic 
implications (test types 2 to 5) and process (test type 6).  
 
Table 2. Classification of tests under the OIA  
No. Test type Applies 
1 Character of the foreign investor To all applications 
2 The absence of (specific) negative 
externalities arising from the transaction 
To applications involving sensitive land 
3 The presence of (specific) positive benefits 
arising from the transaction 
To applications involving sensitive land 
4 The absence of (specific) negative foreign 
trade externalities or breach of international 
agreements in the case of refusal of the 
application 
To applications involving sensitive land 
5 Whether identified benefits are substantial and 
identifiable 
To applications involving sensitive land 
and include >5ha of non-urban land 
6 Whether procedures in the Act have been 
followed to ensure that specific types of land 
have been offered to potential local 
purchasers in addition to the ultimate foreign 
purchaser 
To applications involving farm land 
and/or ―special land‖ (foreshore, 
seabed, riverbed, or lakebed) 
 
Tests for the character of the foreign investor presumably reduce the possibility of future 
negative externalities arising as a consequence of factors associated with the specific foreign 
individuals concerned (e.g. to screen out prospective foreign purchasers with undesirable 
characteristics such as past fraud convictions, multiple bankruptcies, etc). Similar tests are 
used, for example, to restrict who is permitted to become a citizen of, or a company director 
in, New Zealand. Hence the test is prudent if it precludes the possibility of any foreign 
individual who would not meet the standards applied to those New Zealanders owning and 
controlling the New Zealand assets assuming ownership and control of them.  
 
The general process tests (type 6) grant New Zealanders a ‗right of refusal‘ to purchase some 
land assets that might otherwise be sold to foreigners. S.16(1)(f) requires that, unless 
exempted under the Act, farm land must be offered for acquisition on the open market to 
potential local purchasers, however the vendor is not bound to accept a competing local offer. 
By requiring that farm land which might otherwise be sold to a foreigner be offered first to 
New Zealanders excludes the possibility that a private deal is sealed with a foreigner because 
an equal- or higher-valuing New Zealander simply did not know that the property was for 
sale. Whilst such a provision enables an equal or higher-valuing New Zealander to make an 
offer (thereby ensuring both the consumer and vendor surplus remain in the New Zealand 
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economy), it presumes that the vendor was not motivated to seek out the highest-valuing 
individual regardless of nationality in the first place (i.e. simply accepted the foreigner‘s offer 
as it exceeded the vendor‘s valuation). Furthermore, the statutory minimum of 20 working 
days
28
 to notify potential New Zealand purchasers imposes a further disincentive for foreign 
purchasers as it increases the uncertainty that their offer will be accepted.   
 
Moreover, a special type 6 test grants the Crown an exclusive option to purchase ―special 
land‖ – foreshore, seabed or the bed of a river or lake – at a price to be determined by a public 
valuer
29
. This option is best understood in terms of the political sensitivity and controversy 
surrounding potential Maori claims over these types of land.  
 
If the benefits addressed in test type 3 apply to both private and external benefits, and the 
application of the economic tests (types 2 to 5) address the relative weighting given to certain 
and uncertain benefits, then on first evaluation the assessment process appear to conform to 
the general conceptual requirements of the framework developed in Section 2 above. 
However, closer examination of the OIA and its application confirms the presence of 
inconsistencies that may lead to less than optimal intervention decisions occurring. 
 
3.1 Different tests for land and business transactions 
The focus of the New Zealand Act upon the nature of the asset being transacted results in a 
substantially different examination process being undertaken depending upon whether or not 
any sensitive land is involved. If no sensitive land is involved, then only tests of type 1 
(character of the applicant) are applied. Economic tests (type 2 to 5) are applied only to 
sensitive land transactions and business transactions where sensitive land is involved, even if 
the land concerned is peripheral to the business assets being acquired. Table 3 shows that in 
2008, the vast majority (83%) of applications assessed by the OIO relate to transactions 
involving land.  
 
The distinction between land and business transactions is consistent with the Section 2 
hypothesis that governments may take a closer interest in transactions involving land. 
However, the absence of any economic tests in the case of foreign investment where sensitive 
land is not involved allows the possibility of costly negative externalities impacting upon the 
New Zealand economy from such transactions. In practice, the proportion of applications 
pertaining to significant business assets alone in 2008 was small compared to all other 
                                                   
28
 R.9(1)(a) 
29
 S.17(2)(f) and R.12-25. 
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applications (17% - Table 3). None were refused. Whilst the proportion of applications is 
small, as transactions relating to business assets are of very high value (generally with a 
foreign component in excess of $25 million), the economic cost of even a single transaction 
being wrongly approved may be large. Nonetheless, the very liberal approach to business 
transactions may simply be the cost of a policy commitment to free trade. If over a number of 
transactions, on average the benefits exceed the losses, the government may find it acceptable 
to bear this risk.  
 
Table 3. Summary of 2008 decisions under the Overseas Investment Act 2005
30
.  
Test Approved Declined 
Sensitive land 90 1 
Significant business asset 22 0 
Significant business asset on sensitive land 18 3
31
 
Fishing quota 0 0 
Total 130 4 
 
With respect to foreign investment in the equity of a New Zealand company, the OIA test for 
a significant business asset applies if the value of the assets of that company (and the assets of 
companies in which it holds a 25% interest) exceeds $100m. Using a minimum market 
capitalisation of $100m as a conservative proxy
32
 for that test, at least 40% of New Zealand‘s 
listed companies are ―significant business assets‖ under the Act. Collectively those companies 
represent 95% of the market capitalisation of the New Zealand Stock Exchange
33
. 
 
Many foreign equity investment transactions will fall below the thresholds for significant 
business assets, thereby ensuring that the substantial transaction costs of the screening process 
are imposed only in respect of those transactions deemed to be materially significant. 
However, if sensitive land is involved, then the business purchase transaction is subject to an 
OIA assessment regardless of the value of the assets concerned. 
 
                                                   
30
 Compiled from data at http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decisions/index.aspx. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
31
 Two of these three declined applications relate to the single proposed investment by CPPIB in Auckland International Airport.  
The third was New Zealand Steel Mining. These cases are considered in Section 4. 
32
 Due to the way the S.13(a)(ii) is worded, a company whose market capitalisation is lower than $100m but holds a 25% or 
larger equity or control stake in subsidiaries could be considered a ―significant business asset‖. For example, OIA approval was 
granted on 26 June 2008 for a $15.4m purchase of equities in a company with an implied market value of only $35m. 
33
 Calculated using NZX data from 28 September 2009. Index securities, dual-listed and NZAX companies were excluded. 
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By way of example, applications considered under the OIA during 2008 included retirement 
villages, wineries and property development businesses where the business asset value was 
well below $100m. These transactions were required to demonstrate strictly positive net 
benefits to the New Zealand economy, whereas a non-land transaction of a business valued at 
many multiples of these businesses would be subject to no economic test at all. It is 
questionable whether the current regime is applying scarce investigative resources to the 
transactions that pose the greatest economic risk. 
 
3.2 The strictly positive benefits test 
S.16(1)(e)(ii) requires that the benefits associated with the transaction be strictly positive. 
That is, where sensitive land is involved, the prospective foreign owner must demonstrate not 
just that the status quo will prevail as a consequence of the change in shareholding, but that 
the transaction will bring positive benefits to the New Zealand economy. A sensitive-land 
application that is assessed to have a neutral impact upon the New Zealand economy must be 
declined. For example, an existing foreign owner of sensitive land cannot sell that land to 
another foreign owner unless the new owner brings additional benefits to the New Zealand 
economy that the existing owner has not already brought. Owners of the land concerned 
(regardless of their nationality) now bear the risk that a prospective foreign purchaser may not 
be able to demonstrate the presence of such benefits, even when there is no evidence of a cost 
to New Zealand arising from the change of ownership.  
 
The positive benefit test results in a very different allocation of the risks associated with 
business asset ownership depending upon the presence or absence of land. In the non-land 
business case, the government assumes all risks (both positive and negative) to the New 
Zealand economy arising from any sale to a foreign owner. The positive benefit test applied to 
sensitive-land transactions requires that the (private) vendor must personally bear costs from 
the down-side risks to the New Zealand economy as a consequence of the proposed 
transaction being declined. These are manifested in the lower price that will be (necessarily) 
paid for the business if sold to a New Zealand owner (i.e. the net private gain from the sale to 
the foreign tenderer has been foregone)
34
. The positive benefit requirement thus reduces the 
growth potential of the New Zealand economy at the same time as it potentially ‗locks‘ some 
businesses with land associated into perpetual New Zealand ownership, at the private cost of 
its New Zealand owners. 
                                                   
34
 The authors are aware of one case where a tender for a lifestyle block (sensitive land by virtue of adjoining a regional park) 
was awarded to a New Zealander offering 30% less than the highest (foreign) tenderer, due to the inconvenience and uncertainty 
associated with the ensuing OIA process.  
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The inconsistency creates an incentive for the reorganisation of business assets into separate 
firms in anticipation of sale to foreign interests in order to avoid the ‗positive benefit‘ test  
(e.g. one firm managing the land-based assets which is retained in New Zealand ownership 
and another with the remaining business assets which is sold to foreign investors). However, 
where such reorganisation is not feasible, the outcome of a denied application is 
unequivocally a real cost to the New Zealand economy
35
.  
 
3.3 The substantially positive benefits test 
S.16(1)(e)(iii) introduces a further, more rigorous net benefit test when more than five 
hectares of non-urban land is involved in the transaction. In this case the benefits identified 
must be ―substantial and identifiable‖. That is, not only must they be positive, but very much 
greater than zero. The costs and risks borne by owners of this type of land (or owners of firms 
with interests in such land) are therefore very much larger than those borne by owners of 
other types of land.  
 
3.4 Some costs and benefits are excluded from consideration 
In a standard CBA, all relevant costs and benefits of a proposal are calculated converted to 
monetary units, adjusted for risk and time and summed (New Zealand Treasury, 2005). If 
social benefits exceed social costs then the proposal should proceed, at least according to the 
Kaldor-Hicks criteria (see Section 2.2). 
 
Overseas investments in sensitive land are required to meet the test that they will, or are likely 
to ―benefit New Zealand (or any part of it or group of New Zealanders)‖ (S.16(1)(e)(ii)). A 
CBA, taking into account all material costs and benefits (including private costs and benefits) 
would be the standard economic approach to addressing the question. However the Act 
requires that the determination be made under S.17, in which the Ministers must consider 19 
specific factors to determine which factors (or parts of them) are relevant to the overseas 
investment (S.17(1)(a)), and ―must determine whether the criteria in section 16(1)(2)(ii) and 
(iii) are met after having regard to those relevant factors‖ (S.17(1)(b)).  
 
An ambiguity is apparent here — it is unclear whether the list of 19 factors is exhaustive (as 
implied by S.17(1)(b)), or merely a checklist to ensure that specific factors considered 
                                                   
35
 Arguably, the provisions of a type 4 test requiring the absence of specific negative externalities when denying permission for a 
transaction to proceed might be invoked to avoid these consequences. However, the type 4 test in the New Zealand OIA is 
narrow in scope, and in practice will exclude consideration of private costs born by New Zealanders (See Section 3.7 below). 
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important by the legislators are not overlooked (as implied by S.17(1)(a)) while making a 
comprehensive determination as to whether a relevant benefit exists (S.16(1)(e)(ii))? 
 
The ambiguity could be resolved by reference to S.14: 
―The relevant Minister or Ministers, in considering whether or not to grant consent 
to an overseas investment transaction,— (a) must have regard only to the criteria and 
factors that apply to the relevant category of overseas investment under this subpart 
(subject to this section)‖ [emphasis added]. 
 
S.14 constrains decision makers to consideration of the factors specified in the Act and 
Regulations. Those factors are not comprehensive. For example the following would be 
excluded from consideration
36
: 
 Direct effects on indigenous fauna (as opposed to an effect on significant habitats of 
indigenous fauna). 
 Changes in cycling, boating and other recreational access to the relevant land (as 
opposed to walking access). 
 Almost all classes of costs incurred in New Zealand or by New Zealanders resulting 
from refusal of an application. 
 Threats to New Zealand‘s national security. 
 
In summary, assessments made under the OIA are not a full CBA. This creates a risk of 
economically unsubstantiated decisions being made: the approval of applications with net 
costs or the refusal of applications with net benefits. 
 
3.5 Inclusion of private benefits and costs 
Having established that at least some relevant costs and benefits are excluded from 
consideration under the OIA, the key question is exactly what is included. In particular, none 
of the factors unambiguously addresses the assessment of private benefits and costs – a key 
requirement of the framework developed in Section 2. The only two factors that might be 
interpreted to include private gains are: 
―whether the overseas investment will, or is likely to, result in—  
(iv) added market competition, greater efficiency or productivity, or enhanced 
domestic services in New Zealand; or 
                                                   
36
 It is conceivable that some of these examples might be negated through the use of factor R.28(f) which allows the decision 
makers to consider whether an overseas investment might give effect to or advance a significant Government policy or strategy. 
If that is the case however, it would be difficult to argue that the operation of the Act was transparent or predictable. 
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(v) the introduction into New Zealand of additional investment for development 
purposes‖37 
 
It is clear that these factors are interpreted for the purpose of identifying a ―benefit [to] New 
Zealand (or any part of it or group of New Zealanders)‖, so that private benefits to a group of 
New Zealanders are explicitly included, as long as those benefits are of a type described by 
one or more of the factors. 
 
As the terms ―market competition‖, ―efficiency‖, ―productivity‖ and ―development purpose‖ 
are not defined in the Act, and the Act concerns economic matters, it is reasonable to use the 
standard economic interpretation of those terms. 
 
Three types of economic efficiency can be distinguished: 
 Productive efficiency is achieved when goods are produced at the lowest cost of 
production.  
 Allocative efficiency is achieved when resources are devoted to their optimal use. Its 
achievement requires, in general, buyers to face prices that reflect the marginal social 
cost of production, and no barriers to trade. 
 Dynamic efficiency is achieved when optimal decisions are made on investment, 
innovation, entry and exit to create productive and allocative efficiency in later time 
periods
38
. 
 
Productive efficiency is very close to the concept of productivity
39
. Because S.17(2)(a)(iv) 
explicitly lists both productivity and efficiency, it is reasonable to interpret efficiency in its 
wider sense, and not just as a synonym for productivity. Thus allocative and dynamic 
efficiency should be considered by decision makers when assessing this factor. 
 
Dynamic efficiency may or may not be improved by a single overseas investment transaction. 
It may be difficult to forecast the dynamic efficiency consequences of a particular transaction 
at the time of assessment. But dynamic efficiency is promoted by the process of competition. 
Artificial barriers to investment, entry and exit (e.g. arising from inappropriate intervention to 
                                                   
37
 From S.17(2)(a). 
38
 These definitions are drawn from the discussion in Economides (1999). 
39
 Productivity can be defined as the ratio of outputs to inputs. Greater productivity is achieved when increased outputs can be 
produced for the same quantity of inputs, or alternately, the same outputs can be produced with a reduced quantity of inputs. 
- 32 - 
 
prevent a transaction between willing parties from occurring) will, in the general case, act to 
reduce dynamic efficiency. 
 
As explained in Section 2.1, gains from trade arise when a transaction leads to a preferred 
allocation of resources between the buyer and vendor. Such gains can be viewed as a 
necessary consequence of an improvement in allocative efficiency. Thus private gains from 
trade accruing in New Zealand and to New Zealanders directly satisfy the requirement 
for greater efficiency in factor S.17(2)(a)(iv). 
 
Private gains from trade accruing to New Zealanders will necessarily increase welfare in the 
local economy. The gains may be monetary or non-monetary
40
. Monetary surpluses from 
trade may or may not be used directly as ―investment for development purposes‖, but they do 
nonetheless contribute to welfare in the local economy, and hence the potential for 
―investment for development purposes‖ to be undertaken. Whilst a commitment to use gains 
from trade for investment or development purposes could be made in support of a specific 
overseas investment application, there does not appear to be a general case that links local 
private gains from trade with factor S.17(2)(a)(v). 
 
The inherent ambiguity in factor S.17(2)(a)(iv) and the narrowness of factor S.17(2)(a)(v) 
combine to create a situation where the private gains from trade could be overlooked by 
decision makers adhering strictly to narrow definitions of the decision criteria explicitly 
provided in the Act.  
3.6 The weighting of costs and benefits is arbitrary 
S.17(1)(c) allows Ministers discretion to ―determine the relative importance to be given to 
each relevant factor (or part)‖. This provision gives decision-makers complete flexibility to 
attach arbitrary weights to individual costs and benefits. It would be quite legal for decision 
makers to choose, for example, to double each cost and halve each benefit, or apply any 
arbitrary weightings in order to reach a preconceived determination.  
 
While a full CBA could involve the calculation of monetary values for non-traded goods and 
services, and such calculations are by nature imprecise, accepted and defensible procedures 
do exist (e.g. Pearce, 1993; Augustyniak, 1993). Once the conversion to monetary units has 
                                                   
40
 In general, the consumer‘s surplus (the amount he or she was willing to pay less the amount actually paid) on a transaction is 
non-monetary for a final consumer. This would be the case for a New Zealander purchasing a foreign good. The Overseas 
Investment Act is primarily concerned with New Zealanders as vendors selling to foreign purchasers, in which case the vendor‘s 
surplus is monetary and the (non-monetary) purchaser‘s surplus accrues overseas. 
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been undertaken, standard CBA requires that individual factors are not subject to arbitrary 
weighting
41
. The absence of clear guidelines as to how the weighting will be applied exposes 
transactions to considerable uncertainty. The Minister may choose to: 
a) weigh each factor in a single consideration; and/or 
b) apply different weights in different considerations. 
 
This legislated ability to freely apply arbitrary factor weights creates a situation where there is 
no requirement for consistency within and between decisions under the OIA. The outcome of 
any one application is thus unpredictable, and the outcomes of prior applications offer 
minimal guidance for future applicants. S.17(1)(c) thus undermines the integrity of all 
assessments made under the OIA. 
 
Without clear boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable overseas investments, more 
transactions will be subjected to scrutiny than is economically efficient. Changing Ministerial 
priorities will render the outcome of some applications matters of chance or political 
preference rather than decisions based upon economic principles. It would be surprising if 
such uncertainty did not have some effect upon the willingness of foreign investors to 
consider investing in New Zealand assets, especially if the OIA regimes in other jurisdictions 
provide greater clarity and hence certainty.  
 
3.7 Which factual and counterfactual? 
A CBA requires a clear reference point, either against alternative options or the status quo 
(New Zealand Treasury, 2005). Eighteen of the 19 factors include a phrase of the form 
―whether the overseas investment will, or is likely to…‖ – suggesting that the implicit 
reference point in the OIA is the status quo before the application was filed. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.6, the mere act of receiving an offer from a foreign investor to 
purchase an asset changes the status quo. There are two possible outcomes of an OIA 
economic assessment decision – approval and refusal42 – and decision-makers should be 
tasked with contrasting these options and choosing the better of the two, even if the option 
chosen is worse than the status quo before an application was made, a return to which is 
extremely unlikely in the case of a refusal decision. 
                                                   
41
 There may be a case for principled weighting in specific economic circumstances. See Evans (2004) for a discussion.  
42
 S.25 allows the relevant Ministers to grant consent to all or to parts of an application, and to attach whatever conditions to a 
consent that they think appropriate. If such a partial or conditional consent is under consideration, then it would be appropriate to 
include it in as an additional option in the cost-benefit assessment. 
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The remaining factor (R.28(c)) specifically allows for a consideration of the consequences of 
refusing an application, but only in respect of the considerations of adversely affecting New 
Zealand‘s image overseas or its trade or international relations (subsection i) or resulting in 
New Zealand breaching any of its international obligations (subsection ii). This very narrow 
set of criteria makes no allowance for any private costs or benefits, or local externalities, due 
to refusal. 
 
These shortcomings in the Act could enable a high-cost refusal to be chosen over a low-cost 
approval. 
3.8 Definition of an overseas person 
The definition of an ‗overseas person‘, combined with the acquisition threshold of 25% or 
more direct or indirect control of sensitive New Zealand assets appears to result in some 
apparently anomalous investigations. The 25% threshold means firms with ultimately quite 
small proportions of foreign ownership may be subject to testing, but it is feasible for 
significant foreign ownership to arise in some firms without a requirement for OIA approval. 
 
The Act applies to a range of transactions involving ‗overseas persons‘. An ‗overseas person‘ 
is defined (S.15) to be an overseas person making the investment (A), an associate of A in 
relation to making the investment, or in the case of a corporate entity, any individuals with a 
25% or higher ownership or control interest in the overseas entity, members of the governing 
body of that entity or any other individual or body of individuals that the Minister might 
consider to have control of the overseas entity. The OIA process is invoked in respect of any 
purchase by an overseas person of only 25% of a relevant asset, and an ‗overseas entity‘ need 
only have 25% foreign ownership to become subject to the process. Because the 25% 
threshold is applied cumulatively, inevitably the process requires examination of some 
transactions that will confer minimal overseas ownership and almost certainly no effective 
control.  
 
By way of example, electricity supplier TrustPower was deemed a foreign entity in respect of 
the purchase by its wholly-owned subsidiary Follies Limited of 8.71 hectares of sensitive land 
in Marlborough, even though the ultimate beneficial ownership of the applicant firm was 
calculated to be 83% New Zealand
43
. If TrustPower held a 25% ownership stake in another 
(otherwise locally owned) company B, then B would also be considered an overseas person, 
                                                   
43
 http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2008-03/d200810023.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
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despite having almost 96% local ownership. B would be subject to exactly the same 
provisions of the OIA as a 100% foreign-owned foreign-domiciled company. 
 
Conversely, the 25% threshold in respect of each transaction means that the Act may not 
capture dispersed trading that can ultimately result in significant foreign ownership. If a 
hypothetical New Zealand company C had five equal (20%) shares, then those equal shares 
could be freely traded amongst local and foreign investors, even if the firm was valued in total 
at more than $100 million and regardless of the presence or absence an interest in sensitive 
land. Unless two or more of the foreign investors were deemed to be ‗associated‘, it would not 
be necessary for the OIA to screen any sales of shares in C even if the net effect of a series of 
transactions was a change from 100% local to 100% foreign ownership
44
, as each individual 
foreign interest falls below the 25% threshold. 
 
The OIA makes no distinction between transactions that have the overall effect of increasing 
foreign ownership from those that do not change or actually reduce the overall level of 
foreign ownership. When combined with the strictly or substantially positive benefits test, this 
could lead to the requirement to demonstrate strictly or substantially positive benefits arising 
from a transaction that actually increases the share of New Zealand ownership. For example, a 
firm with 25% foreign ownership would require the permission of the OIO to purchase a firm 
D with 50% foreign ownership, even though the transaction would reduce D‘s beneficial local 
ownership from 50% to 75%. Unless sufficient benefits were identified, a transaction which 
had the effect of increasing local ownership would be refused. This is a perverse consequence 
of an Act drafted with presumably the opposite intention. 
 
3.9 Non-economic criteria  
Table 2 classifies the statutory and regulatory tests undertaken on transactions involving 
sensitive land under three broad criteria: character, economic, and process. In undertaking this 
classification, it has been presumed that the primary objective of the Act is to prioritise the 
economic consequences of the transaction. Generally, this appears to be the primary 
consideration given the wording of the criteria. However, two of the factors for assessment 
contained in the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005 appear to leave open the possibility of 
non-economic considerations influencing a decision. These are R.28(f) ―whether the overseas 
investment will, or is likely to, give effect to or advance a significant Government policy or 
                                                   
44
 Of course, once company C became 25% of more foreign owned then further local investments by it would be subject to the 
OIA.  
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strategy‖ and R.28(h) ―whether the overseas investment will, or is likely to, assist New 
Zealand to maintain control of strategically sensitive infrastructure on sensitive land‖.  
 
Whilst it might be expected that a principled assessor would interpret these factors for their 
economic consequences, it may be that for political reasons the underlying policies or control 
intentions are inconsistent with the objective of enhancing national economic growth (such 
policies or intentions could be, for example, the nationalisation of specific industries or New 
Zealand citizen control of specific firms). The presence of these factors in the Regulations 
appears to be more consistent with an objective of limiting foreign control of sensitive New 
Zealand assets per se, than with providing appropriate incentives for both New Zealanders 
and foreign investors to invest and trade in a welfare-maximising manner.  
 
It begs the question of whether it is appropriate to use an Overseas Investment Act which 
ought to be predicated upon economic objectives to achieve overtly non-economic purposes. 
If some assets are deemed so sensitive that it is inappropriate for non-New Zealanders to have 
ownership stakes beyond a certain level, then it may be more appropriate to reserve these 
ownership controls via other mechanisms (for example, specific legislation for particular 
properties or shareholder restrictions in company constitutions) rather than risk distorting the 
flows of international capital in all firms, for fear that the non-economic criteria may be 
brought to bear in an individual decision. Such provisions would also remove some degree of 
judgement required be exercised by officials in the OIO in respect of these non-economic 
criteria, given that there is no guidance given in the Act or Regulations as to what weight 
should be given to each individual factor.  
 
3.10 Transparency, clarity and predictability 
Issues that reduce the transparency, clarity and predictability of the OIA include the lack of 
definition of key terms (Section 3.5), flexibility in the selection and weighting of factors 
(Section 3.6) and lack of a clear counterfactual (Section 3.7). Decisions made under the OIA 
can only be challenged on procedural grounds, and consequently decision-makers cannot be 
held to account for their decisions (other than through the political process). Allowing 
decisions to be reviewed on their merits by the courts would, over time, standardise 
interpretation of the Act and permit the reversal of anomalous decisions, thus improving the 
predictability of its application. 
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3.11 Overseas investment screening in other countries 
In Australia, the presumption is that foreign investment is generally in the national interest 
(The Treasury, 2009). The US regime focuses on national security. The UK places no limits 
of foreign investment. China limits both who can invest (―qualified foreign institutional 
investors‖), the maximum amount they can invest (US$1bn) and the aggregate total of foreign 
investments (US$30bn) in its local share market
45
. The New Zealand system is notable within 
these examples for its focus on land and its strictly positive and substantially positive benefits 
tests. 
 
                                                   
45
 http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/09/04/china-set-to-increase-foreign-investment-limits-to-1-billion/. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
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3.12 Summary 
 
Box 4 contains a comparison of the New Zealand OIA with the conceptual model developed 
in Section 2. 
Box 4. Comparison of the OIA with an ideal overseas investment test 
A2. Private
Local
benefits*
C1. External
Local
costs
C2. External 
Local
benefits
Ideal overseas investment test
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As discussed in Section 2, an ideal overseas investment test would consider all costs and benefits 
that accrue in the local territory (boxes A1, A2, C1 and C2 above). 
 
Under the OIA where sensitive land is not part of the proposed transaction, only external costs 
relating to the character of the applicant are considered (i.e. a small subset of box C1). An 
application will be refused unless these costs are assessed to be zero. 
 
Where sensitive land is part of the proposed transaction, a wider set of external costs (subset of C1) 
are considered together with an incomplete set of external benefits (subset of C2). An application 
will be refused unless private local benefits (box A2) exceed the net external costs considered*. 
Note that the decision makers have complete flexibility as to how the costs and benefits considered 
are weighted in this calculation. 
 
When the benefits are required to be ―substantial and identifiable‖, an application will be refused 
unless the net benefits calculated are significantly greater than zero. 
 
*Despite the analysis in this Section suggesting that private benefits accruing locally (box A2) are 
included in the assessment equation, we will find in Section 4 that they were excluded in a well-
documented case. 
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It would appear that the OIA is less stringent than the Section 2 conceptual framework in 
assessing applications which do not include sensitive land. In theory an application with 
substantially negative net benefits could be approved. It should be noted however, that a 
change of ownership by itself is unlikely to generate negative externalities, and that other 
legislation should act to directly ameliorate externalities
46
. Conversely, the OIA appears 
substantially more stringent than the conceptual framework where sensitive land is involved, 
in particular with the requirement that the identified benefit is strictly positive (or 
substantially positive). 
 
These observations beg the question of the fundamental purpose of the Act. Is it primarily 
focused on the identity of firm owners (foreign or New Zealand) and controlling the extent to 
which the ‗privilege‘ of foreign ownership is granted in respect of specific New Zealand 
assets, or the economic consequences for the New Zealand economy of transactions involving 
foreign entities? From Section 2, the identity of investors should matter only inasmuch as it 
determines: 
 where the private benefits of a transaction accrue (locally vs. overseas); 
and/or 
 the likelihood and magnitude of externalities imposed locally. 
 
If it can be assumed that private New Zealand owners will not willingly trade with foreign 
investors to the extent that there are private detriments to the New Zealand economy, it is 
principally in respect of the external costs to the New Zealand economy where caution needs 
to be applied. These costs may be genuine economic externalities (i.e. tangible additional and 
undiversifiable costs to the New Zealand in excess of the private benefits accrued) or non-
economic consequences (e.g. a reduction in aggregate New Zealand control of sensitive assets 
below an acceptable threshold).  
 
As it currently stands, the New Zealand OIA appears to confuse the accrual of the costs and 
benefits to the New Zealand economy arising from a given transaction with the national 
identity of the individual transactors and preconceived control objectives associated with the 
particular assets being transacted. Consequently, the New Zealand OIA is not well-aligned 
with the articulated government purpose of developing the New Zealand economy to its 
fullest potential. Rather, it appears that the Act defines a set of procedures to ensure that 
                                                   
46
 Arguably the government would be remiss if it imposed laxer standards on local owners than overseas owners. The local costs 
of pollution (for example) are independent of the ownership of the polluter. 
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approved foreign investors are made aware of the ―privilege‖ they have been granted under 
the Act to participate in the ownership and control of sensitive New Zealand assets. For those 
transactions that are subject to the Act, economic considerations are largely secondary to 
issues of the identity of the investor and the sensitivity of the assets concerned. 
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4. Case Studies 
To test the national economic implications of the processes of, and decisions made under, the 
New Zealand OIA, in this Section we examine in detail the three transactions declined by the 
OIO during 2008, and contrast them with one that was approved.  
 
Whilst relatively few applications under the OIA are refused, the cases examined here 
highlight anomalies in the economic consideration of applications that have arisen as a 
consequence of shortcomings identified in Section 3.  
 
4.1 Auckland International Airport 
The proposed sale of shares in Auckland International Airport Limited (AIA) to the Canadian 
Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) offers excellent insights into the guiding principles 
and practical application of the OIA, due to the substantial quantity of information released 
into the public domain following the high-profile rejection of the application. Whilst some 
elements of the transaction are atypical (notably, the political sensitivity of the transaction), 
this case provides sufficient information for an assessment to be made of the processes 
involved, and especially the treatment of the relevant costs and benefits considered and the 
flexibility granted to decision-makers to assign arbitrary weights to particular factors when 
making an assessment of the of economic consequences of the transaction that underpins the 
acceptance or refusal decision. 
 
4.1.1 Chronology 
On 7 November 2007 the CPPIB announced a partial takeover bid for 40% of AIA, a listed 
New Zealand firm both owning land deemed sensitive under S.12 the OIA and meeting the 
definition of a sensitive business asset (exceeding the $100 million threshold) under S.13. The 
offer was made at a 37% premium over the price before takeover speculation started on 5 
May
47
. As an ‗overseas person‘ who under the transaction would acquire 25% or more 
ownership or control interest in ―sensitive‖ assets, the CPPIB applied under the OIA for 
permission to make the investment should the takeover proposal be accepted. On 13 March 
2008 the offer closed. Sufficient votes and acceptances were received from existing 
shareholders to approve the takeover under the Takeovers Code
48
. The OIA application was 
                                                   
47 http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/AIALPartialTakeover_Dec14_2007.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
48
 http://www.aucklandairport.co.nz/Corporate/NewsAndMedia/AllMediaReleases/CPPIB-Update.aspx. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
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considered by the OIO who recommended to the Ministers on 1 April that it be approved and 
the transaction go ahead
49
. 
 
Meanwhile, the Minister of Finance requested that the Treasury draft legislation to 
specifically prevent the transaction from proceeding. The Treasury responded on 29 February 
2008, expressing strong reservations about the Minister‘s proposed legislative intervention on 
legal, commercial and economic grounds
50
. Instead, the Treasury proposed that the legal 
problems associated with the legislative approach could be reduced (but not eliminated) using 
an alternative approach: changes to the Regulations under the OIA. On 3 March 2008 Cabinet 
approved a proposal from the Treasurer to amend those Regulations to ―strengthen the 
scrutiny of proposals which may alter the ownership of strategic infrastructure assets such as 
Auckland Airport‖51. A new factor 28(h) covering ―strategic infrastructure on sensitive land‖ 
was added to the Regulations; making a total of 19 factors to be considered when assessing 
applications. On 10 March 2008 CPPIB announced that it would voluntarily restrict its voting 
rights to 24.9%
52
, in an apparent attempt to limit the applicability of R.28(h) to their 
application. 
 
On 11 April 2008, despite the 1 April recommendation from the OIO that the transaction 
proceed, the relevant Ministers announced that the application had been declined
53
. 
 
4.1.2 Rationale for declining the application  
The reasons for the decision were released along with the announcement. The Ministers were 
not satisfied that all the criteria in S.16 of the Act had been met (Cosgrove & Parker, 2008). 
 
The proposed investment was required to meet all of the seven applicable criteria in S.16
54
. 
The first four criteria relate to the character of the applicant (type 1 tests), and both the OIO 
and Ministers agreed that they had been met. An exemption had been sought by the applicant 
                                                   
49
 http://www.linz.govt.nz/docs/miscellaneous/cpp-20080411.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
50
 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/overseasinvestment/pdfs/t2008-297.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
51
 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/overseasinvestment/pdfs/cabmem-3mar08.pdf. Accessed 2 June 
2010.  
52
 http://www.cppib.ca/News_Room/News_Releases/nr_03100801.html. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
53
 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/ministers+release+decision+overseas+investment+proposal+auckland+international+airport . 
Accessed 2 June 2010. 
54
 The application also had to meet the four criteria in S.18, however these can be disregarded as they are identical to the first four 
criteria of S.16. 
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on the seventh criterion relating to ownership of a farm
55
. While the OIO had recommended 
granting of this exemption, the Ministers declined to consider the issue having found that the 
application did not meet the fifth and sixth criteria. The fifth criterion (S.16(1)(e)(ii)) is the 
―benefit to New Zealand‖ (or any part of it or group of New Zealanders). In assessing the 
benefit to New Zealand criterion the Ministers are required to take into account the 19 factors 
listed in S.17(2) of the Act and in Regulation 28 (summarised in Appendix 1), though they 
may decide what weight to apply to each of those factors. The sixth criterion (S.16(1)(e)(iii)) 
applies when more than 5ha of non-urban land is involved and hinges on whether that benefit 
is, or is likely to be ―substantial and identifiable‖ (the substantially positive benefits test).  
  
The separate assessments undertaken by both the OIO and the Ministers of the nineteen 
factors are summarised in Appendix 2. In the context of the proposed CPPIB investment in 
AIA, all factors except for S.17(2)(a)(iv) are assessed by both the OIO and the Ministers to be 
either a positive benefit for New Zealand, or not have a negative effect. In respect of 
S.17(2)(a)(iv): 
―whether the overseas investment will, or is likely to, result in added market 
competition, greater efficiency or productivity, or enhanced domestic services in New 
Zealand‖ 
the OIO assessed the effect of the transaction as ―unknown‖ whereas the Ministers were ―not 
persuaded‖ that a positive benefit existed. Both the OIO and the Ministers assessed as 
―unknown‖ the effects in relation to S 17(2)(a)(v):  
―whether the overseas investment will, or is likely to, result in the introduction into 
New Zealand of additional investment for development purposes‖. 
 
4.1.3 Analysis 
From Section 3, the New Zealand OIA requires that foreign investment in NZ equities must 
necessarily provide a positive benefit to New Zealand (i.e. an external gain), or ―to any part of 
it or group of New Zealanders‖ (i.e. a private gain). From Section 2, this should be a net 
benefit, taking into account both the private costs and benefits and the external effects.  
 
Using these principles, the CPPIB application appears to satisfy the test of substantial net 
benefits to the New Zealand economy. Firstly, the private gains are substantial. Based upon 
the share price prior to the offer and the price offered by CPPIB, the expected realised private 
                                                   
55
 This criterion (S.16(1)(f)) requires that farm land be offered for sale in New Zealand before it can be purchased by an overseas 
investor. Presumably has the application succeeded on the other criteria, an exemption would have been granted as it would not  
make sense to separate ownership of the relevant farm land (used as a buffer zone and reserved for future airport development ) 
from the airport. 
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gain to those AIA shareholders who opted to sell
56
 is $466m, of which $331m would accrue 
to existing New Zealand shareholders
57
. Furthermore, the existing New Zealand shareholders 
who decline to sell to CPPIB would accrue an unrealized capital gain as a consequence of the 
sale proceeding at the offered price.  
 
Secondly, there are also positive external benefits. Foreign investment in a firm previously 
owned only by New Zealand shareholders increases competition in the market for control of 
those companies. The existence of such a ―market for corporate control‖ is an important 
factor in ensuring the efficiency and productivity of companies (Manne, 1965). Furthermore, 
the potential for foreign ownership increases the potential competition not just for those 
equities, but more broadly for the New Zealand stock market (given that substantial New 
Zealand-owned funds would be freed up for potential reinvestment in other firms).  
 
Surprisingly, however, in the analyses released, neither the OIO nor the Ministers appears to 
have recognised any of these private or external benefits. Indeed, in their assessment, the 
Ministers specifically exclude the injection of foreign capital into the New Zealand economy 
as a consequence of the transaction from consideration as a benefit to New Zealand, when 
they state:  
―There is no legal authority for Ministers to consider funds coming into this country 
as a benefit in itself, independent of evidence that the incoming funds are related to 
the statutory criteria and factors.‖ (Cosgrove & Parker, 2008, p.6) 
 
That is, the $1.75bn purchase price paid (freeing up capital owned by New Zealand vendors 
for further investment in the already thin New Zealand capital markets
58
) was not considered 
a benefit to the country as per S.16(1)(e)(ii). Furthermore, nor were the certain private gains 
accruing to New Zealanders from selling to a foreign investor at a substantial premium over 
the current New Zealand share market price able to enter into the consideration of benefits 
accruing to New Zealand or New Zealanders.  
 
                                                   
56
 We do not have the information to calculate the buyer‘s surplus on this transaction, and recognise that it would accrue in 
Canada anyway. However if it had of been unreasonably large (and not specific to CPPIB), then a counter offer from another 
investor would have been expected. 
57
 This calculation uses a takeover premium of 37%, and assumes that the relative proportions of New Zealand and overseas-held 
share holdings (excluding CPPIB) is unchanged by the takeover. Share ownership proportions obtained from: 
http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2008-04/D200810034.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
58
 See Evans (2009) for a description of the New Zealand equity market. 
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The Ministers‘ conclusion is somewhat surprising, given that both the private and external 
gains from the trade appear to be specifically addressed as relevant in factor S.17(2)(a)(iv) 
(see Section 3.5).  
 
Moreover, the Ministers go on to say that: 
―even if we were accept there was such a benefit, we consider the requirement … that 
the benefit will be, or is likely to be, substantial and identifiable, would clearly not be 
met.‖ (Cosgrove & Parker, 2008, p.6) 
 
Given that the estimated $331 million gain that would have been acquired by the local selling 
shareholders had the sale proceeded is both identifiable and certain; this finding is even more 
surprising. In the OIO analysis, the private and external gains from the transaction as per 
S.17(2)(a)(iv) and (v) were considered ―unknown‖ – their net benefit assessment appearing to 
hinge upon the presence of ―substantial and identifiable‖ historic heritage and walking access 
benefits
59
.  
 
If the $331 million private gain was considered in the OIO or Ministerial assessments, then it 
would be expected that evidence of costs greater than this magnitude would be provided in 
order to justify the application being declined. No such evidence is provided. The application 
was declined by the Ministers on the basis of their not being ―persuaded‖ that benefits existed 
under S.17(2)(a)(iv). Had it been mandatory for the Ministers to consider the economic 
consequences of refusing the application (as discussed in Section 2.6), then the foregone gains 
to shareholders excluded from the original analysis might have entered into consideration. But 
as no such consideration is required under the provisions of the Act, the substantial costs of 
the refusal decision have been borne by private New Zealand shareholders.  
 
Aside from the additional foreign capital entering the New Zealand economy and private 
wealth gains to individual New Zealanders, there still appear to be net private and external 
benefits arising from the transaction
60
. The CPPIB offer related to the purchase 40% of equity 
with only 24.9% of voting control. Arguably, this term was a strategic attempt to circumvent 
the issue of the identity of the controller of the sensitive land as being a potential disbenefit of 
the transaction. Nonetheless, the proposal effectively increased the amount of control power 
per share of every non-CPPIB shareholder. To the extent that control is valued, this is a 
                                                   
59
 See Appendix 2. 
60
 The substantial and identifiable historic heritage and walking access benefits found be the OIO were the basis of their 
recommendation to approve the transaction (Overseas Investment Office, 2008). We would argue that this was an inadequate 
basis on which to decide a $1.75bn investment proposal. 
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positive externality from the transaction that would have been (mostly) realised by the New 
Zealand owners. 
 
If the Ministers had recognised the private gains as relevant, but wished for other reasons to 
discount them, then they would still have had the opportunity to exclude them by applying a 
weighting of zero in their assessment. As an importance ranking of ‗high‘ was assigned to the 
S.17(2)(a)(iv) factors by both the Ministers and the OIO, then it can only be concluded that 
the private gains were either consciously ignored or overlooked in both the ministerial and 
OIO assessments
61
. Furthermore, only an extremely narrow interpretation of the benefits 
accruing from foreign investment or an inappropriate counterfactual could result in a finding 
of ―unknown‖ or insufficiently persuasive external benefits from the transaction. 
 
If the principles adopted for assessing the private and external benefits of this transaction are 
indicative of other assessments, it would appear that a systematic bias exists in respect of 
foreign investment applications involving sensitive land. This bias is likely leading to some 
transactions with net economic benefit to New Zealand being turned down. We note that had 
there been no sensitive land associated with the CPPIB application, then even though it 
exceeded the threshold for ―sensitive business assets‖, no economic analysis whatsoever 
would have been undertaken. The transaction would have been approved solely upon the basis 
of the purchaser‘s character.  
 
4.1.4 Regulation 28(h): strategic infrastructure on sensitive land 
Much of the commentary on the AIA/CCPIB decision has focused on regulation 28(h) and its 
late injection into the decision-making process
62
. Its inclusion was almost certainly motivated 
by political rather than economic factors. If is therefore surprising to find that ultimately, it 
was not necessary to invoke it to prevent the sale of AIA to CPPIB
63
. The normal OIA 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the application (albeit applied as described above) was 
sufficient to prevent the sale. 
 
Indeed, a plain language reading of the new regulation, and the nature of its inclusion into the 
Regulations at the time of the CPPIB application lead us to question the very purpose of the 
Act. R.28(h) requires an assessment of whether an overseas investment in sensitive land will, 
                                                   
61
 The OIO‘s assessment of the benefits under S.17(2)(a)(iv) and (v) was ―unknown‖. We can reasonably conclude that they also 
excluded gains from trade from their assessment. 
62
 See for example, Evans, Quigley & Counsel (2009), Simpson Grierson (2008a; 2008b), and Regulations Review Committee 
(2008). 
63
 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/strategic+asset+investment+test+never+used. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
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or is likely to benefit New Zealand to the extent that the overseas investment will ―assist New 
Zealand to maintain New Zealand control of strategically important infrastructure on sensitive 
land‖. It is extremely difficult to envisage how any foreign equity investment in ―strategic 
infrastructure on sensitive land‖ could ever ―assist New Zealand to maintain New Zealand 
control of strategically important infrastructure on sensitive land‖ (Hansen, 2008). Absent 
clear definitions of ‗strategically important infrastructure‘, there remains considerable 
uncertainly about the application of this regulation.  
 
By effectively introducing a zero incremental control threshold into the OIA, the regulation 
has apparently removed all incentives for foreign investment in infrastructure that might be 
subject to this regulation, as it is unlikely that any purchaser would be willing to pay to obtain 
25% or more ownership with zero control rights. 
 
4.1.5 Summary 
If New Zealand is committed to maintaining a liberal investment regime because New 
Zealand needs foreign capital in order to develop the economy to its fullest potential, then this 
case begs the question of whether the OIA is supporting that purpose. Whilst the Act may 
have been designed with the principal intention to stimulate the inflow of foreign capital, the 
AIA/CPPIB case suggests that in practice, it is being applied in a manner that excludes from 
consideration all private gains emanating from the transaction. Moreover, it is open to being 
used a political tool to prevent specific transactions. 
 
In principle, the provisions of the Act (save for R.28(f) and (h)), if interpreted using the 
economic principles of Section 2, enable the majority of genuine benefits and costs to be 
fairly assessed. Yet in practice, if the analysis of costs and benefits exhibited in the declined 
AIA/CPPIB transaction is typical, then it would appear that the New Zealand OIA is being 
interpreted overly strictly in the case of businesses involving sensitive land regardless of the 
economic consequences. Whilst it cannot be discounted that a different standard was adopted 
for this politically sensitive and high profile transaction, the signal sent by this particular 
ruling will have the same effect upon prospective New Zealand and foreign investors – the 
risks associated with investment in sensitive land and ―strategically important infrastructure 
on sensitive land‖ are substantial enough to discourage such investment. The overall effect is 
likely to be negative for the New Zealand economy.  
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4.2 Vector Wellington Electricity Network 
Shortly after the CPPIB application was declined, the OIO approved the 100% sale of the 
Vector Wellington Electricity Network Limited (WEN) to Cheung Kong Infrastructure (CKI), 
a Hong-Kong based Chinese infrastructure company, for $748m
64
. As no land owned by 
WEN was deemed sensitive under the statutory definition, the application was only subject to 
the less onerous tests applying to significant business assets (Simpson Grierson, 2008b). As 
Vector‘s business includes the provision of local electricity reticulation to all of the capital 
city‘s residences and businesses over a network comprised of 2500km of electric lines, and 
the definition of sensitive land in the OIA is extremely broad, it is somewhat surprising to 
find that this transaction escaped any scrutiny under the sensitive land tests of the OIA. 
 
It is possible, given that it occurred subsequent to the CPPIB application, that the Vector 
transaction was ―carefully structured‖ to avoid invoking the ―sensitive land‖ test (Hansen, 
2008)
65
. As an electricity distribution network would appear to be highly likely to be 
considered ―strategic infrastructure‖66, the rationale for such a strategic rearrangement of 
affairs appears quite plausible. That such restructuring could in theory be undertaken to 
eliminate sensitive land from consideration highlights the weakness of the New Zealand Act 
in precluding economic consideration of transactions where no sensitive land is involved. 
Whilst it may well have been the case that an appropriately conducted assessment may have 
come to the conclusion that the net benefits in the Vector case were positive, it would have 
been prudent to subject this transaction to the same level of analysis as the CPPIB application.  
 
The potential for strategic restructuring that the Act enables is itself costly to the New 
Zealand economy, as it encourages scarce resources to be diverted away from productive 
activity in order to circumvent the OIA processes.  In the absence of externally-imposed 
restrictions, firm boundaries will be set to minimize the sum of production costs and 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1981). Transaction costs become the more important 
consideration when assets are specific to particular transaction. In the case of an electricity 
network, it can be presumed that electricity network infrastructure and the land on which it 
resides are co-specialised assets. Transaction cost considerations favour common ownership 
of those assets; therefore it is reasonable to expect reduced efficiency and lower productivity 
                                                   
64
 See: http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2008-07/D200820007.pdf. Accessed 2 June 
2010. 
65
 As the network has been foreign owned twice in the past (―China's power play‖, 2008), a perhaps more likely explanation is 
that the restructuring occurred some time ago in response to the then prevailing provisions of the OIA. 
66
 Indeed, in many other countries, electricity networks are subject to specific foreign investment restrictions (Golub, 2003; 
Doove, Gabbitas, Nguyen-Hong & Owen, 2001). 
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from separated ownership introduced solely to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Given that ―greater 
efficiency or productivity‖ is presented as a positive factor in S.17(2)(a)(iv), such an outcome 
is perverse. Clearly it is inconsistent with the pursuit of the greatest possible economic benefit 
from transactions involving foreign investment.  
 
It is not known how much ―careful structuring‖ is being undertaken in order to circumvent the 
OIA, nor is it possible to estimate its cost to the New Zealand economy. However, given the 
different standards applying to business assets with and without sensitive land associated, it 
would not be surprising to find a significant number of cases. 
 
4.3 New Zealand Steel Mining 
In August 2008 BlueScope Steel announced an agreement with CKI for the sale of its New 
Zealand iron sands mining and export operation, the Taharoa Iron Sands business, for $250 
million
67
. The Taharoa Iron Sands mine is located 200km south of Auckland and is operated 
by New Zealand Steel Mining Limited (NZSM), a 100% subsidiary of Australian-owned firm 
BlueScope Steel.  The iron sand mine meets the definition of ―sensitive‖ land as it exceeds 0.2 
hectares and adjoins the foreshore, and the value of the business clearly exceeds the $100 
million threshold for significant business assets. CKI had agreed to buy the Taharoa iron ore 
mine with the intention of making additional investment to increase its iron sands production, 
and had presumably included these intentions in its application under the OIA. However 
changes in global economic conditions meant that CKI came to the decision that plans to 
expand the business were no longer viable. It did however express its intention to proceed 
with the purchase of the existing operation at the price originally offered, subject to OIA 
approval. 
 
In December 2008 the OIO declined the application
68
. The application was deemed not to 
have met the ―criteria of substantial and identifiable benefit which was relevant to the 
acquisition of [significant] business assets which included sensitive land‖69. As the purchase 
of WEN seven months previously by the same applicant had been approved, it can be 
presumed that the good character tests had been met and so were not a factor in this decision. 
The OIO statement made particular reference to the fact that the proposed expansion had been 
                                                   
67
 http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/upload_docs/2008/08/Energy/2036/2036_eng.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010.  
68 http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2008-12/C200820037.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
69
 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/purchase+nz+steel+business+assets+declined. Accessed 2 June 2010. 
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cancelled, and no reference to any other factors involved in the assessment. As with the AIA 
case, it appears that neither direct benefits of the sale or costs of refusal were considered. 
 
That the CKI application was declined may not be unsurprising, given the apparently high 
thresholds required to be met under the ―substantial and identifiable benefits‖ test as it 
appears to have been applied in the CPPIB case. However, the NZSM case is notable because 
the vendor was already 100% overseas-owned. A transfer from one (presumably suitable) 
overseas owner to another suitable owner was blocked simply because the decision-makers 
did not identify substantially positive benefits accruing to New Zealand as a consequence of 
the change in foreign ownership.  
 
It is not immediately apparent how the purpose of the Act (―to acknowledge that it is a 
privilege for overseas persons to own or control sensitive New Zealand assets‖) was furthered 
by this decision. If a full CBA including the economic consequences of refusing the 
application had been undertaken, it is likely to have concluded that the New Zealand economy 
would have been worse off with BlueScope Steel continuing to own a mine that it clearly had 
no desire to continue owning given it had found and agreed a price with a willing buyer in 
CKI. As CKI had made a credible commitment to invest for expansion in more favourable 
economic circumstances, the firm would presumably be more inclined than the current owner 
to invest if and when economic conditions improved. This was likely a far better long term 
outcome for the New Zealand economy than preventing the sale of an already foreign-owned 
asset to another (acceptable) foreign owner.  
  
By declining the transfer of ownership from one foreign owner to another (a transaction with 
an apparently neutral effect upon the New Zealand economy), the net result is likely a net 
external cost, as incentives for foreign investors to invest in New Zealand assets were thereby 
reduced.  
 
The decision signals to other prospective purchasers of assets on sensitive New Zealand land 
that even though their purchase may bring benefits sufficient to allow the initial sale to be 
approved, if circumstances change necessitating the future sale of the firm, it may be 
impossible to sell to the highest-valuing individual if that individual is also a foreigner. The 
first foreign owner is in effect locked in to either perpetual ownership or forced to sell at a 
much lower price to a New Zealander, even though a foreigner may be willing to pay a higher 
price for an ‗as is‘ going concern. The CKI-NZSM decision precedent means the price the 
first foreign buyer will be prepared to offer to purchase a New Zealand asset will be 
discounted to reflect the additional risks involved as a consequence of unfavourable OIA 
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decisions occurring in the future. Moreover, anything that lowers the potential return for a 
future overseas owner also lowers the potential returns for current domestic owners, reducing 
their incentives to invest in and expand their businesses whenever foreign investors are 
possible future purchasers.  
 
The requirement that every potential overseas owner of an asset must create external benefits 
over and above those achieved by the current owner creates a ratchet – and therefore a 
perverse incentive for the current owner not to maximize the potential of their business if it is 
likely that they will be selling it in the foreseeable future (Simpson Grierson, 2009). 
4.3.1 Summary 
No apparent economic or non-economic objective was achieved by the decision to refuse this 
sale. Indeed there appear to be substantial net costs to the New Zealand economy from its 
refusal. The decision must therefore be regarded as a perverse or unintended consequence of 
the OIA, and a failure of the relevant Ministers and officials to recognise that situation and 
create an effective remedy. 
 
4.4 J.O. Adams & Son Limited Pension Fund 
In 2008 J.O. Adams & Son Limited Pension Fund applied under the OIA to purchase 61.8ha 
of land near Taihape adjacent to their existing farm: 
―The proposed land acquisition will bring together the existing farm comprising 
159.4269 hectares that the Pension Fund already owns, reuniting land that, until 
1981, was farmed as one economic unit. The Pension Fund intends to acquire the 
land using its cash reserves held in New Zealand. Upon acquisition, J.O. Adams & 
Sons Limited … will lease the land from the Pension Fund and will continue the 
current farm policy of deer and fawn production, as well as sheep and cattle 
farming.‖70 
 
This application was declined in October 2008. The reasoning offered by the OIA in their 
published decision summary is uninformative: 
―The overseas investment transaction has not satisfied the criteria in section 16 of the 
Overseas Investment Act 2005‖ 
 
The ruling gives no indication as to whether the application was declined on good character, 
economic or process grounds. As the Fund has been previously granted OIA approval for 
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 http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2008-10/C200710023.aspx. Accessed 1 June 2010. 
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rural land purchases in April 2001
71
 and May 2002
72
, it is unlikely that the cause of the 
rejection was unsuitability of the applicant.  
 
However an application for the purchase of the same land by the same purchaser was 
approved in February 2009 – less than four months later.  As the same high-profile legal firm 
handled both applications it is unlikely that the first rejection was due to inexperience with the 
OIA leading to a poorly-argued application. 
 
The decision summary for the successful application stated: 
―The overseas investment transaction has satisfied the criteria in section 16 of the 
Overseas Investment Act 2005. The 'substantial and identifiable benefit to New 
Zealand' criteria were satisfied by particular reference to the following factors:  
 Overseas Investment [Act] 2005  
o 17(2)(a)(i) – Creation/Retention of jobs  
o 17(2)(a)(ii) – New technology or business skills  
o 17(2)(a)(iii) – Increased export receipts  
o 17(2)(a)(iv) – Added market competition/Productivity  
o 17(2)(a)(v) – Additional investment for development purposes  
o 7(2)(a)(vi) – Increased processing of primary products  
 Overseas Investment Regulations 2005  
o 28(a) – Consequential Benefits  
o 28(e) – Previous investments  
o 28(g) – Enhance the viability of other investments‖73 
 
There was a change of government in New Zealand following the general election on 8 
November 2008. It is apparent that the incoming Ministers held different views on the OIA 
from their predecessors, so it is not inconceivable that the different decision may have 
resulted from different political directions. However we note that responsibility for this 
decision would have been delegated to the OIO under the Designation and Delegation Letter 
dated 12 December 2007
74
, and this letter still in force in February 2009 when the second 
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 http://canterbury.cyberplace.co.nz/community/CAFCA/cafca01/apr01.html#_Toc522294059. Accessed 1 June 2010.  
72
 http://canterbury.cyberplace.co.nz/community/CAFCA/cafca02/may02.html#_Toc29552893. Accessed 1 June 2010. 
73 http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2009-02/C200821660.aspx. Accessed 1 June 2010.  
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 http://www.linz.govt.nz/docs/overseas-investment/oio-publications-designation-delegation-letter.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2010.  
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decision was made. Similarly the Ministerial Directive Letter of 31 October 2007
75
 which 
guides the interpretation of the OIA had yet to be changed by the new government. 
 
We are left to conclude that the second decision represents a substantial turnaround in 
assessment processes by the OIO on what could not have been significantly different 
underlying case facts. Four months after having found no substantial and identifiable benefit 
to New Zealand arose from the transaction, such a benefit was found with reference to no less 
than nine factors.  Many of those nine factors were clearly applicable at the time of the first 
application.  For example, previous investments, enhancing the viability of other investments 
(the adjacent farms), added market competition and creation/retention of jobs.  Possible 
explanations for the turnaround include lobbying of politicians or officials by the applicant, 
internal policy changes in anticipation of revised government priorities or inconsistently 
applied assessment processes. While we have no information that supports any one or more of 
these explanations being the most plausible in this case, it is of considerable concern that such 
a very different view should be taken of the desirability of what externally appears to be an 
identical transaction.  
 
A principled assessment based on clear criteria of two substantially identical applications 
should have lead to identical assessment outcomes. However, the lack of transparency in the 
official documentation released surrounding the decision makes it impossible to determine 
what was different about the second application from the first. As future potential applicants 
will be relying upon past outcomes in assessing the likelihood of their own potential 
application being approved before even considering whether to make an offer to purchase a 
New Zealand asset, such vagaries are unhelpful. Was the application materially different? Or 
is there substantial discretion being exercised within the OIO processes? In either case, the 
result is that the application process is quite uncertain and therefore outcomes are inherently 
unpredictable.    
 
This case study has highlighted a lack of consistent application of the OIA. Low levels of 
transparency and predictability in the current assessment process is likely harmful to the 
objective of encouraging foreign investment in New Zealand assets. 
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 http://www.linz.govt.nz/docs/overseas-investment/oio-publications-ministerial-directive-letter-20071031.pdf. Accessed 1 June 
2010. 
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5. Discussion 
An Overseas Investment Act should enable the free trade of assets between individuals and 
corporate owners, with minimal intervention rights granted to sovereign governments only in 
respect of instances where there are externalities that impact negatively upon the economy in 
question. Under these circumstances, the interests of private transactors and sovereign 
governments will be aligned, and national economies will have the best possible chance to 
grow to their full potential.  
 
New Zealand has a smaller equity market relative to the size of its economy than comparable 
countries (Evans, 2009). Unlike the majority of those countries, New Zealand‘s domestic 
equity market shrank relative to the economy over the period 1996-2007. Evans also found 
that New Zealand had the smallest average listed company size. Decisions which affect 
incentives to invest in New Zealand firms are vitally important for the economic future of the 
country.  
 
From an analysis of the principles and application of the New Zealand Overseas Investment 
Act 2005, it would appear that there are significant inconsistencies between theory and 
legislation, and between legislation and practice, that are likely hampering the performance of 
the New Zealand economy. The differences between theory and the actual practice of the OIA 
are summarised in Table 4.  These differences are substantial. 
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Table 4. An assessment of the actual operation of the OIA against the conceptual model. 
Criteria Conceptual model Actual OIA 
External costs and benefits 
examined 
All that accrue in New 
Zealand or to New 
Zealanders 
Specified subset 
Private costs and benefits 
examined 
All that accrue in New 
Zealand or to New 
Zealanders 
Ignored 
Weighting of factors Equal weighting in monetary 
terms 
Arbitrary weighting as 
determined by decision 
makers 
Treatment of uncertainty Incorporated into cost-benefit 
assessment based on 
distribution of risky elements 
Arbitrary weighting as 
determined by decision 
makers 
Decision criteria: without 
sensitive land involved 
Net benefits neutral or 
positive 
Character of investor  
Decision criteria: with 
sensitive land involved 
Net benefits neutral or 
positive 
Net benefits positive or 
substantially positive 
Decision criteria: 
transactions between foreign 
parties with sensitive land 
involved 
Suitability of new investor Net benefits positive or 
substantially positive 
 
Decision criteria: 
transactions between foreign 
parties with no sensitive land 
involved 
Suitability of new investor Character of new investor 
Counterfactual Refusal of application The status quo
76
 
Non-economic criteria Achieved via other 
mechanisms 
Mixed in with economic 
criteria 
Transparency of process High Medium 
Clarity of criteria High Low 
Predictability of outcome High Low 
Transaction costs for 
applicants 
As low as feasible Medium 
Treatment of transactions 
where the risks are small or 
easily diversifiable 
Not screened Those involving sensitive 
land are subjected to the full 
screening process 
Suitability of foreign 
investors 
Applicants meet equivalent 
criteria to what would be 
required of a local owner, 
including accounting 
transparency 
Applicants meet higher 
criteria than required of a 
local owner, but no test for 
accounting transparency 
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 Consideration is also given to a very narrow set of consequences of refusal. See Section 3.7. 
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5.1  Does New Zealand need an OIA? 
A reasonable question to pose at this juncture is whether New Zealand needs an OIA at all? 
The Treasury suggests that the Act is somewhat redundant: 
―While Treasury would be comfortable with removing the screening regime 
altogether and relying on protections in other existing legislation, we recognise that 
foreign investment raises concerns for a number of New Zealanders and some form of 
screening may help to alleviate these concerns.‖ (The Treasury, 2009, p.2) 
 
Our conceptual model suggests that there are potential benefits to an overseas investment 
screening mechanism that screens out investment proposals that have substantial net costs for 
the New Zealand economy, if the mechanism can work without imposing significant costs on, 
or completely deterring, other investment proposals. Where the potential net costs are low 
then it is better to avoid screening and accept that the economy will benefit in aggregate from 
the overseas investments, even if the consequences of a subset of applications are negative. 
 
A second reasonable question would be: does it really matter that New Zealand‘s overseas 
investment screening mechanism could turn out to be inefficient, ineffective or sub-optimal? 
After all, Forbes ranked New Zealand 5
th
 in its 2009 ―best countries for business‖ analysis77. 
McCann (2009) notes that for advanced economies, the economic performance of countries 
seems only loosely related to the quality of their institutions, and that economic geography 
and agglomeration are much more powerful predictors of national economic performance. In 
the context of New Zealand, McCann sees the critical issue to be the ability to create urban 
agglomerations that are attractive locations for research and development and as locations for 
functional units of multi-national enterprises. But even if McCann‘s arguments are accepted, 
and improved institutional arrangements will not of themselves engender improved economic 
performance, there remains a strong case for institutional evolution to improve performance 
where this can be done at reasonable cost, in order to ensure that the outcomes achieved – 
within constraints of economic geography – are the best possible. 
 
5.2  Recommendations for change 
Many of the problems with the Act could be overcome by the replacement of the existing 
criteria and factors with a requirement for a full cost-benefit analysis. A reasonable objection 
to this proposal is that such analyses are expensive. However, only in the most borderline of 
decisions is an accurate assessment required of each cost and benefit. In the majority of cases, 
                                                   
77
 http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/6/bizcountries09-best-countries-for-business_New-Zealand_CHI010.html. Accessed 2 June 
2010. 
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a conservative approximation of the largest benefit compared with a generous assessment of 
the likely costs (or a conservative approximation of the largest cost compared with a generous 
assessment of the likely benefits) will be sufficient to determine whether net benefits are 
positive (or negative). 
 
Widening the scope of benefits considered in assessing foreign purchase proposals to include 
private gains to New Zealand vendors and allowing sales to proceed when the benefits to New 
Zealand are not negative will result in a better alignment of the incentives for both buyers and 
sellers to engage in welfare-enhancing trades and improved capital markets performance, 
whilst still precluding investment where this would clearly be deleterious to the national 
economic interest.  
 
Screening is best focused on those specific sectors of the economy with the potential to create 
substantial negative externalities, and on large transactions where the risk is not so easily 
diversifiable. Limiting the application of the OIA to these cases would reduce transaction 
costs, increase predictability and release resources for a more thorough and principled 
evaluation of significant transactions. 
 
Such changes, however, do not address the fundamental conflict between an overseas 
investment strategy seeking increased foreign investment for economic purposes, and the 
application of the Overseas Investment Act for the largely non-economic purpose of retaining 
New Zealand control of a very small subset of assets, such as ―strategic infrastructure‖. It may 
be more appropriate to separate out such assets for consideration of separate, explicit 
ownership controls, thereby enabling the purpose of the Overseas Investment Act to be more 
appropriately and explicitly directed towards national economic imperatives.  
 
Further changes to the Act are also indicated to improve its transparency, clarity and 
predictability. 
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6. Conclusion 
New Zealand‘s Overseas Investment Act permits the confiscation of private property rights in 
order to meet wider social and economic goals. Confiscation – or indeed its mere possibility – 
has the potential to create high costs, so it should be avoided where feasible alternatives exist. 
The processes surrounding confiscation should be of the highest quality, and transparent and 
predicable for participants and observers. 
 
Our examination of the OIA and its application to specific cases shows that it is neither 
transparent nor predictable, and it creates substantial disincentives for both foreign and 
domestic investment.  
 
The review of the Act is both relevant and timely. If New Zealand wants to maximize the net 
economic benefits of overseas investments then substantial changes to the Act are indicated. 
The conceptual model developed in Section 2 and summarised in Table 1 can be applied as a 
minimum checklist of the desirable characteristics of a revised Act. 
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Appendix 1. Classification of tests under the OIA 
 
Section Summary Classification
78
 Test type 
(see Table 2) 
S.16(1)(a) 
S.18(1)(a) 
Relevant business experience 
and acumen 
Risk reduction (investor test) 1 
S.16(1)(b) 
S.18(1)(b) 
Financial commitment Risk reduction (investor test) 1 
S.16(1)(c) 
S.18(1)(c) 
Good character Risk reduction (investor test) 1 
S.16(1)(d) 
S.18(1)(d) 
Security or crime risk Risk reduction (investor test) 1 
S.16(e)(i) Citizen, resident or intending 
to become a resident 
Risk reduction 1 
S.16(e)(ii) Benefit to New Zealand (or 
any part or group of New 
Zealanders) 
Requirement for strictly 
positive benefits 
2/3/4 
S.16(e)(iii) Benefits are substantial and 
identifiable 
Requirement for substantially 
positive benefits 
5 
S.16(1)(f) Farm land offered to local 
purchasers 
Process provides a 
mechanism to avoid negative 
externalities 
6 
S.17(2)(a)(i) Creation or retention of jobs Direct benefit or positive 
externality 
3 
S.17(2)(a)(ii) New technology or business 
skills 
Direct benefit or positive 
externality 
3 
S.17(2)(a)(iii) Increased export receipts Direct benefit or positive 
externality 
3 
S.17(2)(a)(iv) Added market competition, 
greater efficiency or 
productivity 
Direct benefit or positive 
externality 
3 
S.17(2)(a)(v) Introduction of additional 
investment 
Positive externality 3 
S.17(2)(a)(vi) Increased processing of 
primary products 
Direct benefit or positive 
externality 
3 
S.17(2)(b) Indigenous fauna Absence of negative 
externality 
2 
S.17(2)(c) Fish and game Absence of negative 
externality 
2 
S.17(2)(d) Historic heritage Absence of negative 
externality 
2 
S.17(2)(e) Walking access Absence of negative 
externality 
2 
S.17(2)(f) Foreshore, seabed, riverbed 
and lakebed offered to Crown 
Process provides a 
mechanism to avoid negative 
externalities 
6 
(Continued on following page) 
                                                   
78
 This is an economic classification of the presumed intent of the relevant test. In the case of an overseas purchase of equity of a 
New Zealand business in which no additional investment or operational changes were planned, few of the direct benefits in 
S.17(2) are likely to be achieved. 
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(Continued from previous page) 
Regulation  Summary Classification Test type 
(see Table 2) 
R.28(a) Consequential benefits Positive externality 3 
R.28(b) Investor a key person in key 
industry abroad 
Risk reduction/positive 
externality 
3 
R.28(c) Trade and international 
relations 
Absence of negative 
externality (from the denial of 
the application) 
4 
R.28(d) Further significant investment Positive externality 3 
R.28(e) Prior investments Risk reduction/absence of 
negative externality (from the 
denial of the application) 
4 
R.28(f) Advancement of government 
policies or strategies 
Positive externality 3 
R.28(g) Enhancement of other 
overseas investments 
Positive externality 3 
R.28(h) Assist NZ to maintain NZ 
control of strategically 
important infrastructure on 
sensitive land 
Positive externality (or 
absence of negative 
externality) 
2/3 
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Appendix 2. CPPIB/AIA decision: assessments of the benefit to New Zealand 
 
Factor Summary OIO 
assessment
79
 
Ministers’ 
importance 
rating
80
 
Ministers’ 
assessment 
S.17(2)(a)(i) Creation or retention of 
jobs 
Unknown H Unknown 
S.17(2)(a)(ii) New technology or 
business skills 
 H  
S.17(2)(a)(iii) Increased export receipts Unknown H Unclear 
S.17(2)(a)(iv) Added market 
competition, greater 
efficiency or productivity 
Unknown H   
―Not 
persuaded‖ 
S.17(2)(a)(v) Introduction of additional 
investment 
Unknown H Unknown 
S.17(2)(a)(vi) Increased processing of 
primary products 
 N/A N/A 
S.17(2)(b) Indigenous fauna N/A N/A N/A 
S.17(2)(c) Fish and game N/A N/A N/A 
S.17(2)(d) Historic heritage  M  
S.17(2)(e) Walking access  M  
S.17(2)(f) Foreshore, seabed, 
riverbed and lakebed 
offered to Crown 
N/A L Assumed 
conditions met 
R.28(a) Consequential benefits  H  
R.28(b) Investor a key person in 
key industry abroad 
Unknown M Unknown 
R.28(c) Trade and international 
relations 
Unknown H No adverse 
consequences 
of refusal 
R.28(d) Further significant 
investment 
 L  
R.28(e) Prior investments  L  
R.28(f) Advancement of 
government policies or 
strategies 
Unknown H Unknown 
R.28(g) Enhancement of other 
overseas investments 
 L  
R.28(h) Assist NZ to maintain 
NZ control of 
strategically important 
infrastructure on 
sensitive land 
Unknown H  
 
                                                   
79  indicates a positive assessment;  a negative assessment; N/A means not applicable. 
80
 H = high importance; M = medium importance; L = low or no importance. The OIO did not publish an importance rating.  
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